
May 2016
Contents

I. Social Accountability and the Emergence of a New Paradigm 4
   by Roby Senderowitsch, Manager, Country Clients, Leadership, Learning, and Innovation, WBG

II. The GPSA Global Partners Forum 2015 7

III. Case Studies 8

A. Health 11
   1. Dominican Republic | Unified Procurement of Medicines in the Dominican Republic: the Role of IPAC (Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative)
      by Andrea Gallina, World Bank 9
   2. Uganda | Civic Education and Constructive Engagement for Improving Maternal and Reproductive Health 11
      by Richard Mugenyi and Victoria Boydell, Reproductive Health Uganda (RHU)/The Evidence Project 15

B. Education 13
   3. Democratic Republic of Congo | Tuungane, a Community-Driven Reconstruction Program
      by Guillaume Labrecque, International Rescue Committee 15
   4. Malawi | Engaging Traditional Leaders to Promote Child Protection and Access to Education
      by Donald Mogenyi, World Vision UK 18
   5. Moldova | Scoala Mea (My school) - Empowering citizens to enhance educational accountability and achievement
      by Victoria Vlad, Expert-Grup 20

C. Infrastructure 23
   6. India | Citizen monitoring of Road Quality: A Public Affairs Centre Initiative
      by Samuel Paul, Public Affairs Centre 25
   7. Indonesia | Civil Society Engagement within the EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group
      by Maryati Abdullah, Publish What You Pay Indonesia and Margherita Castelli, World Bank 27
   8. Nigeria | The State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) in Jigawa State
      by Jibrin Ali Giginyu, Adam Suleiman, and Helen Derbyshire, SAVI 30

D. Water 33
   9. Palestine | Water supply in Hebron
      by Rasha Alyatim, Applied Research Institute Jerusalem and Joy Saunders, Integrity Action 35
   10. Tajikistan | Improving Social Accountability for the Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
       by Madina Aliberdieva, Oxfam Tajikistan 37

E. Municipal Services 40
   11. Ireland | Placing People at the Heart of Change
       by Cecilia Forrestal, Community Action Network 42

F. Extractives 44
   12. Niger | Civil Society’s Role in the EITI Process
       by Seidou Ariji and Margherita Castelli, Publish What you Pay (Niger) 46

G. Youth 49
       by Caroline Barebwoha and James Powell, UNICEF 51

III. Concluding Reflections 53

Appendix A: List of Case Studies presented at GPSA Forum 2015 56

Editorial Team:
Ghazia Aslam
Olive Moore
with support from Emilie Fokkelman
During the last couple of decades, social accountability has gained higher levels of visibility and attention from the international development community, national governments, the private sector, and of course, civil society actors as well. Social accountability involves a process of engagement and dialogue between citizens, civil society and the state, in order to make government more responsive to citizens’ needs. While it is widely understood that social accountability cannot solve all development problems, there is an increasing realization that this approach, in combination with other governance interventions, can play a critical role in helping countries move forward. This is especially evident when the approach is problem-based and contextually defined. However, there is not a single way for social accountability to operate and the field is defined by a heterogeneous group of approaches that have evolved over time. In this context, a new paradigm seems to be emerging in this field with implications for all stakeholders related to this agenda.

This emerging paradigm responds to six main shifts in this field. First, the realization that constructive engagement between citizens and governments can yield positive results in addressing development challenges. Second, the deployment of social accountability mechanisms as an instrument to change power dynamics. Third, the increasing attention for the need to build coalitions and foster collective action. Fourth, the design of these mechanisms as elements of broader accountability systems. Fifth, the consideration of the need to rebuild citizens’ trust in public institutions. Finally, the need to move from a proliferation of pilots to scaled-up solutions.

First, there is a shift from confrontation to collaboration. A new rationale is defining the emergence of an alternative type of social accountability approach. During its early days, these mechanisms were predicated on the need to create new systems of checks and balances to control perceived disproportionate levels of power of Governments that resulted in rent-seeking policies, high levels of corruption, and ineffective policies. Under this approach, social accountability was the result of “government failure.” This approach many times resulted in empowering citizens against governments in an adversarial relationship as a way to provide public sector officials the necessary incentives for changing their behaviors. The implementation of mechanisms designed under this “confrontational” approach often resulted in social mobilization and media scandals denouncing corruption cases. However, as documented by Jonathan Fox in the GPSA’s first working paper on “Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say” (presented during the first GPSA Global Partners Forum in 2014), this approach was less effective in addressing development challenges in a sustained manner.

However, in the last few years an increasing number of interventions have been defined and implemented under the assumption that a “constructive engagement” between citizens and Government officials is possible. A constructive engagement approach emphasizes the need for public officials and civil society to engage in a sustained dialogue and collaborative problem solving approach. By following a problem-driven approach, these experiences seem to be more effective in addressing development challenges by aligning incentives of multiple actors in civil society, Government and, many times, the private sector.

Second, there is a shift from just conducting political economy analysis to also implementing political economy interventions. Development means change, and change usually implies the redistribution of power among institutions and stakeholders in society. Over time, social accountability interventions became more sophisticated by focusing on design on sound political economy analysis. However, only recently there is a more evident realization that social accountability mechanisms can also empower different actors in society – beyond its traditional approach. As documented in this publication, many times these mechanisms can both empower citizens and mid-level bureaucrats who need additional support for implementing pro-poor reforms. More sophisticated political economy approaches recognize the need to align incentives among different actors in society. This alternative approach, which takes into consideration political dimensions, is predicated on the basis that civil society is not homogenous and governments are not monolithic, opening the way for the establishment of a collaborative approach and the emergence of coalitions that can change power dynamics.

Third, there is an increased attention to the need to build effective multi-stakeholder coalitions that can support sustained collective action, rather than focusing all the energy in building the capacity of individual actors in civil society. Effective social accountability mechanisms require the establishment of coalitions between civil society
and reformers in government (collaborative approach), as well as the design of effective coordination mechanism among civil society organizations themselves. Lately, there are number of examples in which the participation of the private sector in these coalitions played a critical role in bringing about change in a sustainable way. Other key actors range from media to political parties, independent accountability institutions and local authority leaders. Building these coalitions requires a savvy political approach and a necessary articulation among different stakeholders and interests. This also requires a departure from understanding social accountability as “instruments” to a more strategic design of social accountability systems.

Fourth, social accountability needs to be understood in the context of broader accountability systems. Increasingly, social accountability mechanisms are more closely coordinated with other accountability mechanisms in society. There are two ways in which this is taking place. First, the information generated by social accountability mechanisms can feed other (horizontal) accountability mechanisms (such as the Ombudsman Institutions, Supreme Audit Institutions, Anti-Corruption Bodies, as well as the Parliament and the Judiciary) with feedback that comes directly from citizens and users of public services. This can help Government institutions to have access to additional information, as well as to build stronger political support to public sector accountability institutions. Second, social accountability mechanisms can shed light on the corrective measures identified by public sector accountability institutions. In other words, citizens and their organizations can both provide information for government accountability institutions, as well as follow up to and monitor the implementation of corrective measures included in public sector audit reports.

Fifth, there is an increasing understanding of the role that citizen trust in public institutions play in this field especially when it comes to Government response. Without certain level of trust in public institutions, social accountability mechanisms lose the necessary traction to involve citizens in collective actions. Because of the iterative nature of these mechanisms, for social accountability to be effective, citizens need to believe that Governments will respond to their demands and feedback. Even in contexts of low trust, this trust can be built. By bringing citizens closer to policy makers and service providers to fix specific problems, social accountability can help build higher levels of trust in public institutions. Thus, social accountability both requires and can help strengthening trust in public institutions.

Finally, there is a shift from the proliferation of pilots to the implementation of social accountability mechanisms at scale. For many years, social accountability mechanisms were implemented as pilots. International donors and private foundations saw in this approach an opportunity for learning from experience. By letting one thousand flowers blossom, the social accountability field became a natural laboratory for research and learning. However, this resulted in a fragmentation of actions and in many times, limited impact in solving problems and improving the quality of services to ample segments of the population. Increasingly, many organizations – and donors – are moving beyond pilots towards establishing social accountability mechanisms that aim at improving service delivery at the sectoral or national levels. Related to this point, the emergence of alternative funding mechanisms is providing additional opportunities for scaling up these interventions. The collaboration with private sector actors and the monetization of fiscal savings resulting from the implementation of social accountability mechanisms are promising steps in this direction.

These six shifts in the social accountability arena seem to reflect the emergence of a new paradigm that is much more politically sensitive, focused on a problem-solving approach, with the potential of helping eradicate poverty and fostering shared prosperity, all of which are necessary elements for building a more just world with opportunities for all.
II. The GPSA Global Partners Forum 2015

The Global Partnership for Social Accountability is a global multi-stakeholder coalition of donors and development actors that provides sustained and strategic support to civil society organizations around the world that are working together with governments to solve critical governance and development challenges by strengthening transparency and accountability. By doing so, GPSA contributes to achieving the World Bank’s twin goals of alleviating extreme poverty and enhancing shared prosperity. The support comprises funding, and importantly, capacity building and knowledge and learning.

The Knowledge and Learning component of the GPSA offers a number of resources including working papers, think pieces and dissemination notes. It also organizes forums, conferences, roundtables and brown bag lunches for practitioners to share ideas and build on each other’s knowledge for a more informed social accountability practice. Last but not least, the GPSA supports the Knowledge Platform – an online space for sharing and learning on social accountability.¹

As part of the Knowledge and Learning component, the GPSA held its second Global Partners Forum in May 2015. Organized annually, the Forum brings together civil society organizations, academia, businesses and governments from around the world and provides them with a space to reflect on social accountability theory and practice while also discussing about the future of the social accountability agenda.

Focusing on the shifting paradigm in governance toward a citizen-centric approach, the 2015 Forum discussions centered around four of the dimensions (shifts) identified:² a) the importance and processes of constructive engagement between citizens and governments to realize social accountability; b) framing social accountability approaches as political economy interventions that impact power dynamics, c) the significance of coalition building that brings together diverse pro-accountability stakeholders for social accountability, and d) understanding social accountability interventions within the broader accountability systems. In addition, the discussion also highlighted the challenges in scaling social accountability approaches across regions as well as vertically through different levels of government.

GPSA Global Partner organizations presented their experiences along these four dimensions in a series of parallel sessions. These case studies spanned across seven sectors: Education, Health, Water, Infrastructure, Extractive Industries, Municipal Services and Youth. The cases discussed challenges and lessons learned in each of the above-mentioned dimensions. This publication presents thirteen of these case studies. They are authored by GPSA’s partners and have been updated by the authors to include reflections during and after the Forum.³

These cases are exploratory and are based on the authors’ own experiences so it is hoped that these case studies serve to share opportunities and challenges in implementing social accountability from various perspectives. Practitioners will find examples of how various challenges were overcome in different contexts. They will be able to find inspiration of how social accountability interventions can be designed to address specific problems and serve as food for thought for further research.

Before delving into the case studies, this chapter briefly elaborates on the dimensions addressed during the Forum

---

¹ GPSA Knowledge Platform: http://gpsaknowledge.org
² The fifth topic, interaction between citizen trust and social accountability, was also discussed as a separate dimension. In this report, this topic is merged into constructive engagement as a lot of overlap was observed between these two dimensions during the discussions.
³ Reflections and opinions expressed in this document are the authors’ own and do not reflect the position of the World Bank or its staff. The WBG does not guarantee the accuracy of the information.
II. Case Studies

A. Health

Strengthening accountability has been recognized as one of the core elements of health sector reform (Boydell and Keesbury, 2014). Policy makers and practitioners have looked to social accountability in their efforts to improve accountability relationships in the sector for a more effective, efficient and equitable access to healthcare. Social accountability approaches in the health sector can improve outcomes by decreasing leakages of resources, and increasing public oversight. The stakeholders in health systems include government officials (health ministers, frontline staff), insurance agencies, public and private providers, citizens and communities (Ringold et al. 2012).

Social accountability interventions in the health sector have largely focused on three approaches: health budget formulation and review, resource tracking and audits, and community participation in monitoring health service delivery.

Health budget formulation and review aims to assess if appropriate resources are invested in health sector and to incentivize government officials for better performance. It is expected that the input of citizens and civil society group in budget formulation will open up officials to greater scrutiny, and encourage them to allocate more funds to health services at local levels. This approach has been applied in some contexts with promising results. For example, in Mexico, IPPF (2012) reported that budget analysis and advocacy activities by a consortium of national civil society partners increased funds for state implementation of health projects on reproductive health. Similarly, a budget analysis intervention in South Africa encouraged the government to initiate a number of programs to prevent and manage HIV and AIDS in the country (Overy, 2011).

Even when appropriate resources are allocated to the health sector, the provision of services may be affected by leakage of resources, and corruption in contracting and procurement. Social accountability approaches involve citizens and civil society groups to monitor and track the resources, thereby aiming to minimize the leakages and improving accountability in resource use by different stakeholders. For example, Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), the technique that traces the flow of resources from origin to destination, was used in Tanzania, and led to improvements in service delivery (Sundet, 2004). Similarly, public expenditure tracking in Honduras in 2000 exposed the extent of ghost workers and staff absenteeism in the sector (World Bank, 2010).

A similar approach is social audits in which relevant stakeholders including service providers, government officials and citizens to publicly share information on available resources allocated for service delivery. There are well-reported examples of the beneficial effects of social audits in improving health service delivery from different aspects. For example, in Nepal social audits in 2013-2014 led to improvements in the behavior of health workers, and made health facilities more responsive to patients’ needs (Wilson, 2015). Dominican Republic, Panama, and India have also instituted social audits, to name just a few (Boydell and Keesbury, 2014)

Another social accountability approach used to improve outcomes in the health sector is by directly involving citizens at the local level in monitoring of services. For example, citizen report cards and community scorecard approaches solicit citizens’ and communities’ feedback about the quality of service provision. This feedback is then disseminated to all stakeholders with an aim to designing a joint practical approach for addressing issues identified in the feedback.

Many examples show that these approaches have led to positive outcomes. Community scorecards in Tanzania led to citizens having more knowledge about health systems, as well as positive health seeking behavior (CARE, 2012). In Brazil, citizen report cards led to the restructuring of the providers’ role, delivery patterns and management of services (Diaz et al. 1999). Citizen report cards have also been used in Bangalore, India to assess services provided by the maternity homes run by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation. Government officials responded to almost all concerns raised by the process (Ravindra, 2004). Recently, ICT has been used in soliciting citizens’ feedbacks. Citizens in Uganda, for example, are prompted to report cases of absenteeism, late-coming of staff, and neglect of duty in health facilities through ICTs, in a recent program by Transparency International (Nalwoga, 2015).


Unified Procurement of Medicines in the Dominican Republic: the Role of IPAC (Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative)

By Andrea Gallina, World Bank
Country: Dominican Republic

Introduction
In the mid-2000 prices of the medicines in Dominican pharmacies were on average 722 times higher than the prices of the medicines that people could purchase through the Promese/CAL “People’s Pharmacies” network. People’s Pharmacies is a government program that makes available affordable essential generic medicines for low-income families in all state-owned and managed health care premises, pharmacies and hospital pharmacies.

Considering that 80-90% of the medicines are purchased out of pocket, and that medicines in the Dominican Republic (DR) represent the main health expenditures for the lower income households, making the system more efficient would have significant impact in terms of both poverty reduction and shared prosperity. During the past 20 years, various attempts were made to reform the procurement of medicines in the Dominican Republic. High prices, discretionary procurement, and vested interests of pharmaceutical companies and public officials limited the full application of the existing Decrees. In June 2010, the situation reverted and the reform momentum was built again in the framework of the Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative (IPAC).

The Intervention
IPAC was launched by DR’s President to define a governance and anticorruption strategy and identify actions to accomplish the strategy. It brought together over 350 representatives from key government agencies, civil society, private sector and development partners including the World Bank.

Following the collaborative process of IPAC, a set of 30 recommendations of the ten working groups, including of health sector, was published online and then presented to the government at a public event in October 2010. After the government adopted these recommendations, an Observatorio Ciudadano de Implementacion (OCI-IPAC, a Citizen Observatory for Implementation) was created with support from donors. OCI-IPAC is a coalition of 14 CSOs, coordinated by Participacion Ciudadana (PC), a prominent transparency and anticorruption CSO in the Dominican Republic. Since early 2011 the OCI has played a key role in the IPAC process. It independently monitored progress in the IPAC recommendations and reported publicly on its assessment of the program's progress.

The reform of the procurement of medicines was the key priority for the Health Working Group of the IPAC. In order to fulfill its agenda, IPAC’s primary strategy was to build a strong social coalition of relevant stakeholders. Following the IPAC process, in 2010 the government established SUGEMI (Sistema Único de Gestión de Medicamentos e Insumos (i.e., Integrated System for Medicine and Supply Management) as the institutional mechanism for organizing the pharmaceutical supply system in the public network of health care facilities. The decree gives PROMESE-CAL responsibility for purchasing, stockpiling, and delivering drugs to public hospitals, clinics, and health care providers.

Results
After SUGEMI was implemented, PROMESE began to absorb a growing share of public procurement through competitive tenders in the domestic market, and costs have declined accordingly. The director of PROMESE

---

maintains that centralized purchasing saved the public sector approximately RD$1.3 billion (or about $27 million) in 2014, or 64 percent of state spending on drugs. The Unidad Nacional de Gestión de Medicamentos (i.e., National Pharmaceutical Management Unit, or UNGM) recently found that the prices paid by hospitals and clinics that retained control of their own purchases were on average 722 percent higher “than those of the same products purchased through PROMESE/CAL, with extreme values ranging from 63 percent to 1,965 percent.”

SUGEMI has been able to maintain these gains for several reasons. The first, and perhaps most widely anticipated, are the savings derived from greater transparency in public tenders. To the extent that decentralized agents are tempted to engage in corrupt practices, in other words, they are less able to do so in public tenders. The second, and perhaps most important, are economies of scale. By centralizing control over government purchases, the decree effectively turned PROMESE into a monopsonist, and thus gave the agency tremendous bargaining leverage. The third, if perhaps least recognized, concerns the pace of payment. PROMESE is known for making prompt payment, and as several manufacturers remarked, they are willing to accept lower prices for their products in exchange for reliable terms of payment. And, finally, there is the matter of expertise. Over the years, PROMESE has built up a corps of well-regarded professionals who are guided by reference prices and procedures that lean toward efficiency and effectiveness—something that cannot be said for most hospitals and clinics.

---

Coalition Building

An important strategy of IPAC was to re-align the incentives of all stakeholders through coalition building. The President and his cabinet tended to favor the unification of procurement. They stood to benefit not only from the enormous cost savings the reforms would generate in a time of fiscal austerity and expanded public health care coverage but from the political popularity of abundant, low cost drugs among the population at large. Civil society also favored the reforms. On the other hand, hospitals, clinics, and decentralized agencies did not have the incentive for centralization as it would diminish their autonomy. Incentives of pharmaceutical industries were more mixed.

Bringing many relevant actors into a social coalition and giving them a space to build a strong pro-reform multi-stakeholder coalition changed the incentive structure of all stakeholders. It put the health procurement reform on the radar again and made its progressive application transparent. It did so in a visible arena in which opposition was rendered difficult. The engagement with the Media and the high profile of participants made the cost of not participating very high. In that sense, the IPAC served as a force multiplier of sorts. By drawing attention to a reform with a large, but diffuse, win-set, it allowed reform-mongers to beat back opposition, break through the logjam, and open the door to victory.

---

6 Diario Digital 2014.
7 UNGM 2013, p. 9
8 Interview, Dominican government official, December 2014.
9 Interviews with ADOSUME members, December 2014.
10 Interview, Dominican civil society representative, December 2014, as well as observations and discussions at PROMESE-CAL.
Civic Education and Constructive Engagement for Improving Maternal and Reproductive Health
By Richard Mugenyi and Victoria Boydell, Reproductive Health Uganda (RHU)/The Evidence Project
Country: Uganda

The Story
Uganda is dogged by poor health indicators especially in the area of maternal health. The rate of maternal mortality in Uganda is among the highest in the world—438 deaths for every 100,000 live births according to the Uganda Demographic Housing Survey 2011.

In 2010 in Busia District in Eastern Uganda, with over eighty percent of its population (250,000) living in rural villages, the fertility rate was 7.1 births per woman, the maternal mortality ratio was 435 for every 100,000 live births, and infant mortality ratio was 83 per 1,000 live births. The district health system comprising two health facilities suffered a number of challenges: delays in accessing services at health facilities; low functionality of health unit management committees (HUMCs); budget constraint; understaffing at the health facilities; and inconsistency in the delivery of drugs to lower health facilities. Women seeking reproductive health and family planning services often had to wait a long time, which could extend over days, with few options to use other health facilities.

A group of concerned residents decided to take action and report the situation to the District Health Officer in Busia Town, but their complaint remained unaddressed. As one resident of Busia explained in 2010: “Initially, we had two health workers; a nurse and midwife but the nurse was transferred to another health centre and no

Constructive Engagement

The process of IPAC is a great example of constructive engagement. The IPAC was governed by a Multi-stakeholders Steering Committee with two top Ministers sitting in it (Presidency and Economy), and key private sector and civil society representatives that gave strong legitimacy to the initiative and signaled commitment from various sectors of society. A series of incentives were put in place, which incentivized all actors to work collaboratively. These included: making the reform process transparent, with government officials accountable for it and the possibility to access to capacity building for CSOs to monitor the process. The Health Working Group was particularly active. It took advantage of the participation of strong “health sector” NGOs coalitions (INSALUD) and of small and medium-sized enterprises in the health sector.

This process provided both civil society and the government a structured and disciplined approach to the reform. Even though they approached the process of collaboration with the government reluctantly, CSOs gained an important space to discuss openly with the Government on pending key reforms and made the argument for increased capacity to monitor public policies. The Government Focal Points had the incentives to show good performance during the accountability workshops, while they were getting indirect support from the coalition. Donors’ active engagement created a sort of safe heaven or neutral space for stakeholders to discuss intractable issues such as corruption in the procurement of medicines. After the government adopted the recommendations suggested by the working group, the government gave space to civil society to provide independent monitoring.

Although this single initiative does not solve the low level of confidence in the institutions, it shows that it is possible to act collectively. Indeed the fact that the methodology was replicated in similar initiatives to promote reforms in education (IDEC) and competitiveness (CGF) in 2013-14 and with good results is an important sign towards that direction.

-A2-

Civic Education and Constructive Engagement for Improving Maternal and Reproductive Health
By Richard Mugenyi and Victoria Boydell, Reproductive Health Uganda (RHU)/The Evidence Project
Country: Uganda

The Story
Uganda is dogged by poor health indicators especially in the area of maternal health. The rate of maternal mortality in Uganda is among the highest in the world—438 deaths for every 100,000 live births according to the Uganda Demographic Housing Survey 2011.

In 2010 in Busia District in Eastern Uganda, with over eighty percent of its population (250,000) living in rural villages, the fertility rate was 7.1 births per woman, the maternal mortality ratio was 435 for every 100,000 live births, and infant mortality ratio was 83 per 1,000 live births. The district health system comprising two health facilities suffered a number of challenges: delays in accessing services at health facilities; low functionality of health unit management committees (HUMCs); budget constraint; understaffing at the health facilities; and inconsistency in the delivery of drugs to lower health facilities. Women seeking reproductive health and family planning services often had to wait a long time, which could extend over days, with few options to use other health facilities.

A group of concerned residents decided to take action and report the situation to the District Health Officer in Busia Town, but their complaint remained unaddressed. As one resident of Busia explained in 2010: “Initially, we had two health workers; a nurse and midwife but the nurse was transferred to another health centre and no

12 The district has two health centers -- a health center level III, which should be found in every sub-district and have about 18 staff with a functioning laboratory, and a health center level II, which serves a few thousand people led by an enrolled nurse and a midwife. A level III health center should be able to treat common diseases, should run an out-patient clinic and provides antenatal care.
replacement has been made since then. We have raised this issue over and over with the district health office without any response so far."

That is where Reproductive Health Uganda (RHU) and German Foundation for Population (DSW) came in and launched the Healthy Action project that focused on social accountability and citizen participation to increase the responsiveness of governments. The project took place between 2010 and 2013 and was premised on the basic principle that for social accountability to be effective, political leaders should have clear and transparent benchmarks based on laws and policy, which they are then assessed against. Citizens must be aware of these benchmarks and empowered to demand that these benchmarks are met. The role of civil society is to inform communities about the benchmarks and how to monitor local government, as well as to inform local government about the benchmarks and how to meaningfully engage citizens.

The Intervention
The project comprised a series of policy analyses, civic education and facilitated dialogues between citizens and local authorities.

Budget and policy analysis: A policy and budget analysis was conducted to better understand the budget process, funding cycles and budget responsibilities. It also mapped the primary decision makers in health policy. The data collected at the district was compiled into a national budget study that targeted national and district decision makers. The findings were analysed to compare the levels of health funding with commitments. Meetings were held between the CSOs and decision makers, MPs, civil servants and district officials to discuss study findings and current health issues, to provide technical input into numerous policies and strategies, and to get their buy in.

Civic education activities: In addition, civic education activities formed the core of the Health Action project. Training was cascaded down to community members in Busia district, through edutainment activities that provided community members with information on their rights and decision-making processes in health sector. They learned to identify priorities and to demand accountability.

Interface meetings: Interface meetings with district and sub-country decision makers followed the above mentioned activities. These meetings sought to provide a platform to jointly deliberate on the district development plans and budgets for maternal and adolescent health, and find collective solutions.

Results
The project has led to a number of tangible results in improving maternal health outcomes. For example, in response to the community’s demands to improve equipment and staffing at the local health facilities, the local government bought equipment worth 16 million Ugandan Shillings (about US$5,500) to boost service delivery in the district. These were delivered to three maternity units in Wabuleke, Buwembe and Sukuda.

"In response to demands from the community, we have been able to buy maternity equipment. All Health Centre IIs in the district now have delivery sets and delivery beds. Additionally, health center IIs were given delivery beds so that they can start doing deliveries" - The District Health Educator said.

At least five HCIIIs were equipped with delivery beds and delivery kits so that they were able to support deliveries. Under the Support Decentralised Systems (SDS), 16 health workers were also recruited, accommodated and priority was given to HC2s and HC3s in the district. According to the Busia District Medical Office records, this has led to better service outcomes. Facility based deliveries have increased from 15-17 to over a 100 deliveries a month.
B. Education

Social accountability has been used effectively in education sector across the globe to improve education outcomes. Some characteristics of education sector make it especially amenable to social accountability. Provision of quality education services depends on multiple accountability relationships among a large number of stakeholders, for example, between policy makers and citizens, among different tiers of government, school administration and teachers, and between teachers and their students. Social accountability approaches can effectively complement other forms of accountability in enforcing these multiple relationships. Moreover, education outcomes overwhelmingly depend on teacher behavior in class and with her students, which is difficult to measure and standardize (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004; McLoughlin and Batley, 2012). Social accountability approaches can provide for more effective monitoring in this scenario.

Various social accountability approaches are used in the education sector with aims as diverse as to tackle the problem of teacher absenteeism and increasing accountability in the procurement of textbooks. Perhaps, the most prominent way has been to establish forms of multi-stakeholder decision-making and monitoring bodies such as School Management Committees (SMC) or Parent Teacher Associations (PTA). Stakeholders generally include community members, parents, students, teachers and local government representatives. These bodies vary widely in the role they perform. In some countries, SMCs have a high degree of autonomy over staffing and budgets, while others have authority to set curricula but not over budgeting and staffing. Still others only have advisory roles. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have established some of the strongest SMCs. Other countries where SMCs and PTA have assumed prominent role in exacting accountability in education sector include Nepal, Indonesia and Pakistan, among others.

Citizen based monitoring of use of public resources in education sector (for example, through Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)) is another approach that has been used extensively. In this approach, citizen groups and civil society organizations track the flow of public resources for the provision of public goods from origin to destination in order to determine how much of the originally allocated resources reach each level. One of the most widely cited example of PETS in education is Uganda, which was the first country to carry out PETS in 1995. The PETS showed that on average less than 30% of allocation grants reached the schools. It also motivated governments to make the transfers more transparent, and changed the procurement and transfer processes. It has also been implemented in many other countries such as Tanzania, Ghana, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zambia, PNG, Honduras and Peru. GPSA is also supporting a similar approach in Malawi.

Another way in which social accountability approaches have aimed to improve transparency and accountability is by generating information and soliciting feedback from various stakeholders including parents and teachers. The idea is to capture stakeholders’ perception of quality of public service and identify issues and challenges, and to use this information to galvanize public debate. This process is generally followed by engagement between citizens and government officials to find solutions to the challenges identified. The process is usually called Citizen Report Cards, Stakeholder assessment, or Community Score Cards. The information targeted could be used to compile different indicators e.g. teacher attendance (Galeb et al. 2013; Zeitlin et al. 2011), quality of facilities in school, enrolment, student attendance and retention, and student performance. Egypt and Morocco have implemented these approaches (Beddies et al., 2011), among others. Two projects featured in this publication in education sector also use this approach.

More recently, ICT has become widely used to solicit such feedback. A prominent example is ‘Check My

---

13 For example, see Bruns et al. (2011), Chapter 3.
14 For example, see Ye and Canagarajah, 2000)
15 See GPSA website for more details about the project.
School’ from the Philippines, which is an interactive platform that allows all stakeholders – students, parents, administrators and teachers – to send their feedback to the government.

Less frequently, citizen’s charters and codes of conduct have been used in education sectors to improve accountability. These mechanisms help set standards and monitor performance of school staff and other actors in adhering to these standards. An example of this approach can be found in Peru (Cotlear, 2008).

References


Tuungane, a Community-Driven Reconstruction Program  
By Guillaume Labrecque, International Rescue Committee  
Country: Democratic Republic of Congo

*The Story*

Eastern Congo has been plagued by conflict which has destabilized the country, destroyed social infrastructure and weakened state and civil society-run mechanisms of service provision, thereby severely restricting the population’s already-limited access to basic services. Moreover, communities are often disengaged from decision-making processes around public service delivery, thus limiting their input into how these services function and address their needs.

Since 2007 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and its partner CARE International, have implemented a large-scale community-driven reconstruction project in eastern DRC. It is named Tuungane (“Let’s Unite” in Kiswahili) and is financed by the UK government. Tuungane seeks to empower communities in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga so that they can have greater voice and control over their own development.

Tuungane operates on the premise that people’s needs are best met when public authorities are responsive to citizens’ needs and priorities, and when citizens can engage in decision-making and hold service providers and government officials to account. IRC supports each community in the program area to identify one of the five sectors (education, health, water and sanitation, road or market) in which they want to invest, make decisions regarding this investment and manage a community block grant provided for the rehabilitation of basic social infrastructure. 55% (568 out of 1,025) of communities where Tuungane is implemented chose education as their priority sector.

The education system in the DRC has performed badly over a long period of time. Decades of neglect has resulted in an adult literacy rate under 70 percent in 2006. Schools are overcrowded and often lack equipment, water and sanitation facilities, and adequate teaching and learning materials.

*The Intervention*

In each community where Tuungane is implemented and a community block grant is provided, a Village Development Committee (VDC) is created by the IRC to facilitate community decision-making and manage resources on behalf of the population. VDC are composed of five elected posts (president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and community mobilizer) and four appointed members from the parent-teacher association (PTA). Village chiefs are special advisors to the VDC.

When community members decide to use the community block grant in the education sector, Community Score Cards (CSC) are also implemented to determine exactly how resources are invested and to monitor service delivery performance. Communities decide to use the block grant in various ways including for rehabilitation of classroom and latrines, the purchase of desks, chairs, board and textbooks (see table below).

The CSC process includes initial training on the process, data collection on norms and entitlements, on citizens’ satisfaction, and self-assessment of service providers. Data collection is followed by an interface meeting between users, PTA and service provider during which they develop a joint service improvement plan (JSIP). Communities and line ministries then endorse the JSIP and its implementation begins. As the implementation progresses, these steps are repeated twice to stimulate community participation and oversight. At the end of the

---

16 CSC is implemented in communities only where education or health sector is selected by the community where community block grant is to be spent.
intervention a meeting with line ministries is organized to present progress and to secure ongoing support for outstanding issues.

The primary premise of CSC is that it helps to improve the relationships between service providers and service users. It provides greater access to information and creates a space for dialogue between service users and providers, thereby supporting collective problem-solving, citizen voice and fostering greater accountability and responsiveness from service providers. The intervention also contributes in the long run to incremental changes in behavior of providers, government officials and citizens and in the way they interact with each other, so that mutual collaboration improves. Ultimately, this contributes to greater accountability, improved access and quality of services.

The disbursement of community block grants and the CSC process are carried out simultaneously, which adds to the effectiveness of both inputs. While the CSC process guides the use of community block grant and provides a mechanism to monitor service delivery performance, the possibility of investment through the block grant helps motivate stakeholders to reach consensus.

The experience of Tuungane suggests that in contexts where access to resources is low, the absence of new resources may limit the opportunity provided by social accountability (SA) interventions by failing to stimulate citizens’ and government officials’ motivation to engage with each other constructively. At the same time, new resources without an effective SA mechanism are also not sufficient to encourage collaborative behavior.

Results
Between 2011 and 2014, Tuungane disbursed approximately $13.7 million in community block grant to 568 communities who chose education as their priority sector. As a result of this program, there has been a significant improvement of the infrastructure in the education sector. The intervention has also resulted in better access to service. According to the citizen perception surveys, access to and quality of services and equitable treatment amongst users has improved, on average, from okay to good (from 3 to 4 on a Likert scale).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Haut</th>
<th>Katanga</th>
<th>Maniema</th>
<th>North Kivu</th>
<th>South Kivu</th>
<th>Tanganyika</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classroom</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student desk</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>4,639</td>
<td>4,974</td>
<td>17,250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-doors latrine</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>461</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-doors latrine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water point</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 The IRC defines infrastructure improvements as any positive change in the building where services are provided. Communities decide the extent to which they would like to improve their infrastructures and budget according to their preferences. VDCs then publicly award the contract to local enterprises. They monitor progress against established rehabilitation benchmarks and Congolese education sector norms.

18 Analysis conducted by Gururoop Wazir, Research Assistant, Humanitarian Assistance Applied Research Group, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, with supplemental analysis provided by the Tuungane team. Analysis results submitted 22 June, 2015. This document is not publicly available but can be requested.
Political Intervention

The intervention is framed by an analysis of power dynamics at the local level. This analysis suggests that traditional village leadership hold a significant amount of power over who can access services. Initially, village chiefs were not allowed to run as candidate to the VDC because of the fear of elite capture of resources and processes. However, in order to ensure that they were not alienated, they were later included in the VDC as special advisor. This arrangement provides traditional leaders with a formal role while making sure that decision-making power is mostly held by democratically elected representatives. In practice, this set-up is accepted by all stakeholders and empowered representatives to ensure that needs and preferences of their constituents are taken into account when making decisions.

The programme contributes to changes in the political dynamics and power at the local level. For example, VDC and PTA became progressively more vocal in demanding change and accountability from service providers and ensured that women’s views were actively solicited in decision-making processes. Bylaws giving PTA voice and responsibilities to approve budgets and monitor expenses were passed many years ago but they became effective only during program implementation. This change clearly shows up in numbers; perception of community members of PTA’s engagement in the financial management of services changed from bad to good (from 2 to 4 on a Likert scale) after the implementation of the program (Wazir, 2015). This is quite a significant change in power dynamics at the local level where school principals, as put by one of staff, were often perceived as “little kings” who were not transparent nor accountable (personal communication).

Furthermore, in many communities service providers started divulging budgets and other documentation in excess of what was strictly requested by the program. For example they did not only report on project funds, they also reported on the entire school budgets including funds received by the Congolese government.

Constructive Engagement

Constructive engagement among citizens, relevant government officials and service providers is one of the main tenants of Tuungane.

Service providers and line ministries engage with users and their representatives on multiple occasions throughout the intervention. By the end of 2014, 2,840 meetings were held between service providers, PTA and line ministries and 568 JSIP were developed.

IRC staff have also organized and held round tables to engage government officials at higher levels of government, for example from Ministère de l’Enseignement primaire, secondaire et professionnel (Ministry of Education – MoE) and Ministère de l’Intérieur, Sécurité, Décentralisation et Affaires Coutumières (Ministry of Interior, Decentralization and Customary Affairs), to present recurrent problems for which solutions are not locally available, for example adding teachers to payroll and the need to increasing technical supervisors of schools. These meetings are also used to sensitize government officials on the Tuungane program, report on program achievements, and share lessons learnt. The program staff also organizes for government officials to visit communities to expose them directly to service delivery problems and to provide a space for citizens to express their preferences and needs.

This engagement is important to achieve results because there is an information asymmetry between users, user representatives, frontline service providers and technical line ministries. Through continuous engagement, they all access new information, are exposed to complex challenges and ultimately are granted an opportunity to find mutually agreeable solutions that are appropriate to the local context.

All stakeholders have incentives to constructively engage with others and to find collaborative solutions to service delivery problems. Service providers are motivated by their incentive to maintain good relationship with the MoE as the ministry oversees their performance. Peer recognition provides an added incentive to engage with government officials and citizens. Arguably, one of the most important incentives for some stakeholders is provided by the newly injected resources in the form of community block grant. All stakeholders continue to engage with each other in order to influence how these resources are used. The grant provides additional resources to line ministries, for example in the form of means of transport to and from each school. They also receive a symbolic representational fee. Once incentivized, however, they genuinely try to find solutions to the service delivery problem.

Despite these incentives, there have been occasions, especially at the early stage of implementation, when government officials refused to work collaboratively. For example, they did not want to provide budget information that was supposed to be available publicly. In those instances, the lack of engagement from government officials was countered by holding side meetings with program staff. It provided an opportunity to sensitize them about the advantages of transparency and community participation. They realized that sharing information and maintaining open communication could also work to their advantage because it sensitized citizens on resource constraints and helped manage citizens’ expectations.
The Story
Zomba District is one of twelve Districts in the southern region of Malawi. The District has a total population of 583,167, more than half of whom are 18 years or younger. The District has experienced a sharp increase in school enrolment. Primary school net enrolment is currently at 87.2% against the country rate of 80.0%. However, the education sector in Zomba at all levels continues to face a number of challenges, including teacher qualification, shortages in the total number of teacher and student accommodations, lack of or dilapidated classrooms and lack of teaching materials. In Chingale, one of the Zones in Zomba District, the overall pass rates from primary schools have progressively decreased over the years for both boys and girls, with pass rates for girls significantly lower than for boys. In addition, less than 35% of the pupils in the District make it to secondary school and the dropout rates remain high.

In response to poor education outcomes, World Vision (WV) has been implementing Citizens Voice and Action (CVA) approach in Chingale, Zomba District, Malawi, since 2010 with the aim to improve education services quality. The CVA approach seeks to mobilize citizens, equipping them with tools to monitor government services and facilitates a constructive engagement between citizens, government officials and service providers to find collaborative solutions to improve the quality of services at the local level.

The approach is premised on the view that citizens have the right to communicate with, and have a relationship with their government, and that ultimately active citizenship and engagement of citizens with government also helps governments to work more effectively in providing quality services.

The intervention
The Community Scorecard process forms the basis of the CVA approach. After citizens, service providers and local government officials collaboratively measure monitoring standards for the performance of schools, a scorecard process takes place. In this process, education outcomes are assessed and stakeholders’ perceptions of school quality are recorded using simple qualitative method. The interface meeting follows this process where stakeholders share the information from the monitoring standards, and results from the scorecard process with a broader group. Based on this information the community members, government and service providers create an advocacy action plan to improve the delivery and quality of education services. The communities then begin to implement and monitor the action plan.

Results from the scorecard monitoring processes in Zomba identified a number of issues that negatively influenced education outcomes. These included: deteriorating facilities in school, low student attendance, increased teacher absenteeism, and high school dropout rates attributed to high prevalence of child marriages and excess of daytime theaters visited by children.

Following up on this evidence, and on the action plans developed in the interface meetings convened by World Vision, the local Traditional Authority – who are legally and formally recognized as leaders of their respective communities and custodians of customary lands and traditional values – constituted a working committee at the district level that included representatives of community members, traditional leaders (from across the District), representatives of parents, and Primary Education Advisors (state officials). The committee was mandated to develop long-term solutions to the identified problems through a consultative process that involved other stakeholders such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, CSOs, and Parliamentarians.
### Results

The consultative committee proposed the passage of a number of by-laws to deal with the issues such as low student and teacher school-attendance, and high dropout rates due to child marriages. The by-laws institutionalized the role of parents in monitoring and providing oversight over education service provision within the District. The by-laws also addressed social issues that had been identified as negatively affecting education outcomes; for instance prohibiting chiefs from consenting to marrying children under 18 years old, making it mandatory for parents to send their children to school and encouraging community members not to allow children to engage in activities that were contributing to increased absenteeism (for example children visiting theatres during school time). The by-laws also provided guidance on the code of conduct of teachers. The District Commissioner and the local level General Assembly subsequently endorsed these by-laws.

The enforcement of these by-laws has contributed to an increase in enrolment and pass rates in the District. The dropout rate in Chingale has significantly decreased, and more children are now completing their primary school education than previously reported. For instance, in Mtunguluti Zone, which has 13 schools, the dropout rate by grade 8 decreased from an average rate of between 20-25 percent to between 3-5 percent (as reported by the District Education officer).

### Coalition Building

Building strong coalitions was an integral part of the intervention, especially since the by-laws would not have been deemed legitimate if a broad coalition spanning across officials and traditional local leaders, parents and representatives from the Ministry of Education and the District Assembly did not support them. The interface meetings that were followed by the scorecard process provided a platform for these stakeholders to come together.

Traditional leaders were at the center of this coalition building process as they enjoyed strong legitimacy with citizens, and had social and political clout with government officials. As a result, they were able to mobilize both community members and government officials in working collaboratively to solve common problems. Moreover, in an environment where citizens and government officials did not trust each other, traditional authorities' presence provided a safe space for citizens and government officials to start communicating with each other. As the process continued, both sides gained each other’s trust.

Increased trust between citizens and government officials was obvious as the extent of citizen participation in monitoring and interface meetings increased as measured by WV Influence and Engagement matrix – a tool used to score the space for and quality of engagement with decision-makers. Results from the matrix showed that community representatives have regular meetings with significant stakeholders involved in education service delivery and there is strong evidence that proposed plans have been influenced by their opinions.

### Constructive Engagement

Throughout the intervention, World Vision collaborated with District Ministry of Education office and members of parliament through the District Assembly. Traditional leaders - especially Chiefs- were also continuously involved in the process.

The main incentive for government officials, both elected and non-elected, to engage with other stakeholders was the realization of a shared obligation to ensure access to education for girls. The voice and demands raised collectively by community members provided an additional incentive to the officials to collaborate on this issue. The involvement of the traditional leaders provided an added impetus to the District Assembly and other officials to collaborate with communities, as the Traditional Authority has significant convening powers and influence over decisions and policy-making at the District Assembly.

The collective voice of the community strengthened the resolve and political clout of the pro-reform officials; they were even more encouraged to pursue reforms by the strength with which communities expressed their recommendations and the desire for change. The political pressure also led to the buy in from senior officials at District level (which was akin to an official endorsement of the process). As a result, even reluctant government officials were forced to change their positions since being perceived to be against or in opposition to the reforms would have attracted sanctions and possible administrative action from their superiors who were supportive of the reform plans.

In addition, government officials also realized that these education sector reforms, and their collaboration in implementing them would help them achieve targets and national goals with regard to pupil/teacher attendance, enrollment, dropout rates and elimination of harmful traditional practices within their districts. This also contributed to their willingness to engage constructively with citizens.
Scoala Mea (My school) - Empowering citizens to enhance educational accountability and achievement
By Victoria Vlad, Expert Grup
Country: Moldova

The Story
Moldova’s education sector faces serious challenges. The Government spends roughly 7% of GDP on education, which is high by regional standards, but educational results have been limited. Moldova’s students score is among the lowest in the region on international comparative exams, such as PISA. They lag behind their OECD peers by approximately two years of schooling, and some 60 percent of Moldova’s 15-year-olds lack basic reading and math skills.

In 2011 the Government launched a bold and challenging reform package to improve the quality and efficiency of the education sector. To date this has included: (1) the introduction of a per-student financing mechanism, (2) increased autonomy for schools to manage their financial and human resources, (3) the re-organization of the school network, including the amalgamation and closure of certain schools in response to the dramatic decline in student numbers, and; (4) the development of quality assurance standards for schools. The effects of these reforms are just starting to be felt.

One key feature of the reform package has been the decentralization of education management from municipal to school administrator level. This has allowed community stakeholders to engage directly with those who can influence their school’s priorities and budgets. It has streamlined and increased the accountability arrangements between citizens and service providers.

As the Government undertakes its top-down reform package, it is simultaneously partnering with Expert-Grup, an independent think-tank in Moldova—with support from GPSA—to enact bottom-up interventions aimed at improving the education sector. The project is called Scoala Mea (my school) and focuses on increasing transparency on school performance, operations, and budgets for students, parents, teachers and broader community and thereby increasing accountability within the school system.

The Intervention

10 The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a worldwide study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in member and non-member nations of 15-year-old school pupils' scholastic performance on mathematics, science, and reading. It was first performed in 2000 and then repeated every three years. It is done with a view to improving education policies and outcomes. It measures problem solving and cognition in daily life.
Scoala Mea’s implementation started in January 2014. Expert-Grup invited schools from across the country to apply to take part in the project. After a competitive process, the initial 20 pilot schools, located across 7 districts and Chișinău municipality, were selected. In 2015, the next 20 schools selected are located across 12 districts (out of 35 administrative areas). Expert-Grup selected schools who have established a School Administration Board and a Student Council, and who expressed the willingness to implement social accountability tools.

This process will be repeated each of the next four years and will ultimately directly engage 100 schools across the country. During the pilot stage following activities have taken place for the selected 20 schools.

**Data collection/Feedback:** In the project’s initial year, Expert-Grup and its five regional partners have collected data and feedback via stakeholder report cards from over 9,000 students, parents, teachers, and school administrators to highlight their concerns and priorities for their respective schools.

**Public hearings:** The data is then channeled back to schools at public hearings, where the local communities have the chance to influence their school’s future priorities and spending.

**Data dissemination:** The data has also been aggregated to help inform the Ministry of Education as it continues to adjust its reform efforts. The data has also been presented back to education stakeholders including parents, students and general public in two ways: (1) via the scoalamea.md website, and (2) via 1-page informational sheets distributed to school constituencies in each of the pilot communities.

**Results**

The project aims to involve citizens in monitoring school performance and holding to account anyone in the education sector who underperforms or breaks the rules. Even though the project is only a year old, it has achieved some important results.

For the first time in Moldova, large and diverse groups of stakeholders with an interest in education (parents, students, teachers, administrators, public officials) have come together to both influence the design of education services and to monitor performance at the school level. In February 2015 the Minister of Education approved the Regulation on School Administration Boards which obliges all schools to organize annual open budget hearings, informed by stakeholder report cards based on the same format as applied in the Scoala Mea project. What started in 20 schools, as a result of this project, has now been transformed into national-level policy.

The project has also ignited spill-over effects, with some mayors publicly committing to use Public Hearings in the general business of their local communities.
Constructive Engagement

Expert-Grup has worked in tandem with government officials throughout the process of the intervention. Both the Minister and Deputy Minister of Education have been highly supportive of the project. The Ministry has provided highly detailed school-level data, including budget transfers and spending breakdowns of the pilot schools, for the ScoalaMea.md website. This has allowed local stakeholders not only to understand individual school budgets, but to draw comparisons against other schools.

Constant engagement of civil society with the government from the beginning of the project ensured that all key stakeholders take ownership of the project. The Ministry of Education was involved in the design, piloting and implementation of the project since its inception. It has also peer reviewed the social accountability tools being used to collect feedback from citizen stakeholders. Expert-Grup has also transferred the results of the first year’s data collection to the Ministry to feed into its planning processes. The Ministry of Education is also kept updated about the project activities. Constant communication and collaboration throughout the project has improved mutual confidence and has strengthened the Ministry’s support for the project.

In addition, the project has created avenues for citizens to engage with the government through Public Hearings. At least 100 people from each school attended these hearings. This gave them a chance to review school budgets and debate and influence upcoming priorities with the government officials. Moving forward, Expert-Grup plans to encourage even larger public hearings.

An outstanding challenge is also to strengthen citizen engagement with public officials at district (rayonal) level. The presidents of rayons disburse supplementary education funds to the schools within their jurisdictions. Expert-Grup plans to investigate more fully how it, and the schools it works with, can more effectively engage with district-level institutions to advance the goals of the project.

Coalition Building

Expert-Grup implements this project with a strong coalition of regionally-based and locally-rooted civic organizations, experts and media. Its coalition partners administer the stakeholder report cards, facilitate the public hearings events, and liaise with school administrators, parents, students and teachers in the target schools. Media has also played a key role in advancing the project’s aims by increasingly discussing school budget transparency, by showcasing the project’s results and by disseminating information on how other schools can get involved and benefit from this project.

At the local level as well, a coalition of core stakeholders is established to help guide the entire process. Local coalitions are composed of school staff including school director and deputy directors and teacher representatives; representatives from civil society, business community, parents, and students; and government officials from the local government.

Over 600 people have already joined the local coalitions, almost double the number the project had originally anticipated. The local coalitions have been trained by the regional partners to apply social accountability tools, such as the report cards, independent budget analysis and public hearings.

Joining the coalition also provides some community members the chance to exercise leadership in the community and students to be involved in extracurricular activities. It also allows school administrators (directors) to showcase their results and gain leverage to raise funds for school projects.

Scaling Up

Scoala Mea was designed to ignite a critical mass of schools to undertake a participatory feedback process and public budget hearings. The idea was that if the 100 pilot schools produce meaningful results, and if those results are captured effectively by the media, then it would put pressure on non-participating schools to launch the same process as well. This vision was given a strong boost in early 2015 when the Government announced—due to Scoala Mea’s first year of operations—that henceforth all schools will be mandated to introduce these accountability processes.

In Moldova, the promulgation of a law or regulation does not mean it will be adopted in practice. Much work remains to be done to provide effective examples to schools across the country to infuse these processes into their standard means of operation. But due to the success of the first round of schools, the increased media attention the project is receiving, and the national regulation supporting these measures, there is great scope for scaling up and achieving national level impact over the coming years.
C. Infrastructure

The infrastructure sector comprises a broad range of projects and activities including the building of roads and bridges, construction of buildings for public facilities, and infrastructure for power production and distribution. The size of these projects also varies in terms of the number of stakeholders and amount of funds involved. Accountability is a substantial issue in almost all types of projects. The opportunities for fraud, bribery, embezzlement and patronage are higher in the provision of infrastructure than for other public goods (Bardan and Mookerjee, 2000). For example, contracts for projects can be awarded to individuals and companies based on nepotism and patronage rather than on merit. Or, the quality of infrastructure built do not meet the standards. Corruption and favoritism can also skew spending priorities, for example, diverging resources to build a road in an area where its utility is lower than in another area.

In this context, social accountability approaches can provide an effective mechanism to increase accountability. When citizens are involved in selecting projects, identifying appropriate project specifications and monitoring bidding processes, there is less opportunity for officials and private companies to digress from the set standards. It will also help to ensure that funds are allocated to infrastructure projects that are needed instead of selecting projects for patronage purposes. Social accountability mechanisms can also help governments to monitor private contractors, so that citizens become partners with the government in improving the quality of infrastructure projects.

A number of social accountability approaches have been implemented in infrastructure projects that target the whole cycle of infrastructure project – from selection of the project, bidding and awarding of contracts, monitoring during project construction, tracking funds, and ensuring that the final project is delivered according to agreed upon specifications. However, since the monitoring of public funds and construction project requires specific technical expertise, training of community members is a pre-requisite.

One of the approaches is to establish a committee at the community level, which then participates in different aspects of the infrastructure construction project. For example, in Vietnam, through the Commune Development Budget Component of the Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project, communities participated in selecting infrastructure projects in their areas. They also monitored procurement processes and participated in supervising the construction of the projects. Similarly, in India, community members were trained to monitor the bidding process for the award of contract for rural roads under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) program – a rural development program aimed to provide all weather connectivity in rural areas. They also monitored the construction process to ensure that the roads adhered to quality standards. Citizen Report Cards were used to collect feedback on citizens’ access to services, quality of road services, and satisfaction with public service delivery. There are some indications that this process has led to more responsive government officials, and that the procurement process has become more transparent (ANSA, 2012).

Following the same tradition, a fund in Peru called Focodes convenes a community assembly to prioritize small-scale infrastructure projects and elect a small group of community members to propose, manage and supervise the selected priority projects, with support from a national technical assistance agency (Glassman et al., 2008). In El Salvador, such groups called Social Audit committees, also performed the same function in monitoring the construction of roads.

In some contexts, where communities are not involved in the process of infrastructure construction, they perform assessments of the project after completion and compare the actual project specifications to agreed upon criteria. In 2007 in Indonesia, community members along with CSO members identified discrepancies between actual and proposed project specifications in the construction of an anti-abrasion wall. The community members started a dialogue with the contractors and government officials, who then committed to follow up after uproar about the issue in the media (Haerudin, n.d). Similarly in the Philippines, The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (CCAGG) found widespread discrepancies and anomalies between government reports and outcomes on the ground, including ghost projects and incomplete works, and followed up with national agencies responsible for monitoring the private contractors (Glassman et al. 2008). In Afghanistan, as well, in order to strengthen community focus in the second round of the National Solidarity Program (NSP), a Community
Participatory Monitoring (CPM) committees were formed that comprised of community members. They assessed the quality and progress of ongoing sub-projects and identified problems, needs, gaps, and proposed respective solutions. The CPM teams shared their findings with community members and with the Monitoring and Evaluation department of the NSP, which then followed up with respective stakeholders (Sarwary, 2008).

Another instrument that citizens and civil society have used to improve accountability in the infrastructure sector is through the use of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys. For example, PETS was implemented in Tanzania in 2001 to track expenditure and resources in the construction of rural roads. The results revealed under-reporting of receipts at the district level. Following the PETS, the country’s Treasury decided that all transfers to districts from the central government would be advertised in the media in an effort to reduce opportunities for corruption by increasing transparency (Sundet, 2004). Similarly, in India and Uganda, community monitoring groups were formed who tracked expenditures, reported on municipal under-spending and checked that public funds were disbursed for intended purposes (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009).

References


https://saeguide.worldbank.org/infrastructure

Haerudin, Ihsan (n.d) “Strengthening the role of CSOs in Monitoring Public Expenditure and Devleiry of Infrastructure and Services: International Experience of Indonesia’s PBET Program”


Citizen monitoring of Road Quality: A Public Affairs Centre Initiative
By Samuel Paul, Public Affairs Centre
Country: India

The Story
Public dissatisfaction with road quality was severe in Bangalore, India in the 1990s. Roads were constructed by contractors, with minimum oversight and low regard for quality standards. Citizens believed that there was much corruption in road building, and that it was the collusion between officials and contractors that perpetuated the problem. During this period, Public Affairs Centre (PAC), a non-governmental think tank and citizen support group in Bangalore had launched its “citizen report cards” (CRCs) on public services that attracted much public attention. Along with other civic groups, PAC had organized a mass protest march in Bangalore that sought government action to improve the condition of roads. The public hearings PAC held in the city had led to a constructive engagement of public agency heads with citizens.

It was against this backdrop that PAC decided to develop a citizen friendly tool for monitoring road quality. Its first step was to set up a small group of 12 people, including road experts, to brainstorm about this project and test its feasibility. These citizens held several meetings and came up with a way to simplify the technical tests that could shed light on road quality. They felt that ordinary citizens, with some training, could be enabled to use these tests and highlight the results to engage with public authorities to improve road quality. The group also persuaded a specialized agency that designed and produced instruments to support citizens on technical matters, to conduct some training. The citizens’ group’s final output was a manual (published in 1999) that spelled out the guidelines needed for understanding and using the tests in the field.

The Results
PAC then decided to put the manual to test on the new roads in Bangalore, a city of six million, in 2000. They enlisted more volunteers for this purpose and carried out the tests on 11 roads. The measurements were noted and analyzed, and a report prepared to be taken to the authorities. At PAC’s request, the City Commissioner (the top city official) organized a meeting to discuss the report. He was clearly aware of the road quality problem. But PAC had no way of knowing how he would respond to the experiment’s findings. After listening to the report, he asked his chief engineers and contractors (also present at the meeting) to rectify the problems and errors highlighted in the report, with immediate effect. It was only then that PAC realized that the Commissioner was in favour of reform and was willing to take corrective action based on the report. At this point, PAC knew that the monitoring tool developed by the group had the potential to stimulate public authorities to act and to hold road builders accountable.

It is not easy, however, to scale up a pilot project in a large country like India. PAC decided that wide dissemination of the Bangalore experiment and the distribution of the new manual would be the best way to move forward. It was a pleasant surprise when the Karnataka State Government bought 5000 copies of the manual for its own use. PAC considered this a positive impact as the state government had distributed the manual to its large pool of public works engineers for their training. But it was unclear whether other states or the Government of India would adopt or at least welcome this new citizen monitoring tool.

Unexpectedly, PAC had a call from the Director General of India’s National Rural Roads Agency (NRRDA), asking whether the manual could be adapted to its needs. This Agency was responsible for rural road projects in all the states of India, and had a huge budget. PAC responded positively, and the rest is history. Simplifying the tests for rural roads, and pilot testing the new set of tests in several rural locations took more than two years. The results were discussed with NRRDA officials who had to take the next steps. The NRRDA-PAC collaboration that emerged after a series of consultations, opened the door for the large scale replication of the PAC model across the country.
Discussions took place in Delhi that resulted in the incorporation of this citizen monitoring tool in a four billion dollar road project in which the World Bank was also a partner. An important point to note is that the advocacy needed for the Government of India to adopt this tool was done by NRRDA itself. In the first phase that started in 2013, PAC worked in three states along with local NGO partners and volunteers to plan and implement citizen monitoring on 70 roads. Over 176 volunteers and several NGOs have participated in this project. The findings were discussed in meetings with all stakeholders and corrective actions taken by the authorities involved. Recently, NRRDA has decided to extend citizen monitoring with PAC’s help in seven states across the country.

**Scaling Up: Shifting Roles**

It was Government of India’s positive response to the new citizen monitoring tool that motivated PAC to scale up its operations in several states across the country. Moving from the pilot experimental stage to the replication stage across large geographical areas entailed many organizational changes. The scope of work and the funds required increased significantly. The planning of operations became more complex and their execution called for the creation of networks and skills that were not necessary at the pilot stage. As a result, scaling up called for some important shifts in the roles that PAC had to play. These shifting roles of PAC could be summed up as follows:

- From leader to enabler
- From doer to coordinator
- From advocacy to resource management

At the pilot stage, PAC had acted as the leader and controlled all the needed activities. It could plan and oversee all the work that was going on, and hence controlling them was not difficult. But when scaling up occurred, such direct control became impossible. Given the spread of the states involved, new partners had to be found who could organize and monitor the use of the tool in different locations. These partners and the volunteers had to be trained. The test instruments to be used had to be procured and distributed. And the state officials had to be oriented for the collaborative work in the field. PAC had to act as an enabler in this new setting.

As noted above, PAC could no longer do or manage all the activities spread over several states. Its new partners took over this task. PAC’s role now was to coordinate the work of the partner NGOs and volunteers. This entailed ensuring the delivery of multiple functions by partners, checking on quality, and coordinating data analysis and stakeholder meetings.

Finally, PAC’s advocacy role that was essential in the pilot stage was no longer necessary as the state agencies were already on board and did not need to be convinced of the value of the monitoring tool. Instead, PAC had to pay more attention to the allocation and use of funds, conflict resolution among the different stakeholders, and keeping close relations with NRRDA, the nodal national agency.

Performance of the new roles meant that PAC had to restructure and strengthen its organization with persons with a different set of skills than it had at the pilot stage. The challenge of scaling up was to ensure that the voice of the rural citizens was heard and that social accountability was enhanced in the infrastructure arena through the catalytic role of PAC and its network.
Civil Society Engagement within the EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group
By Maryati Abdullah, Publish What You Pay Indonesia and Margherita Castelli, World Bank
Country: Indonesia

The Story
Indonesia’s extractive industries sector has been expanding rapidly in the last decade. In order to provide citizens with accessible information about revenues flowing from extractive industries, the Government of Indonesia has been committed to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). EITI is an independent, internationally agreed upon, voluntary standard for creating transparency in the extractive industries and requires transparency in payments made by companies and revenues received by governments from country’s extractive resources. Part of the requirements include publishing an EITI report to present this data in an accessible form.

Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) was endorsed by the Government of Indonesia when the President signed Presidential Regulation on Transparency of National and Local Extractive Industry Revenue into force in 2010. The government requested a formal admission for Indonesia into EITI candidacy from the EITI Board in Sep 2010 and in 2012 started the process of ‘EITI validation,’ which is an independent assessment of compliance with the EITI’s requirements. Countries that meet these requirements are designated as EITI Compliant. Indonesia reached EITI compliant status in October 2014.\(^2\)

The EITI process is overseen by a Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) that is made up of government, companies involved in extraction of natural resources and civil society representatives. The MSG develops the work plan, decides on the format of the reporting template, produces the EITI reports and ensures that the data is comprehensive and publicly accessible. MSG comprises officials from Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, government officials from various related departments, members of Associations of Local Governments, members from mineral, coal and oil and gas industrial associations, and members from civil society which have a history of engagement with the issue of extractive industry revenue transparency.

CSOs play an important role in MSG. Their engagement in the group provides the CSO with a platform to advocate the issues of transparency, negotiate citizens’ points of view, and influence the process. In order to be able to play this role, civil society need to have the requisite capacity, be familiar with many technical issues on extractive industries, and have skills and knowledge of public finance management.

At the Table of EITI Multi-Stakeholder Initiative
Indonesia CSOs are members of the EITI Multi-Stakeholder Initiative, which is a relatively new model of policy engagement in Indonesia. This facilitated the freedom of information (FOI) law implementation in 2010. In addition, the Presidential Regulation on EITI was released by the Presidential office. CSOs are also members of the Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG), which direct EITI policies and processes.

Publish What You Pay Indonesia, the civil society coalition for transparency and accountability of extractive industries was established from the beginning of EITI Indonesia’s advocacy campaign in 2007. When Indonesia became a member of the EITI, the MSG of EITI Indonesia was settled by the Presidential Regulation (No.26/2010). Publish What You Pay Indonesia conducted the Civil Society constituency process to select three CSO representatives for the MSG EITI initiative.

\(^2\) Indonesia’s EITI compliant status was suspended in Feb 2015 due to the failure of the EITI multi-stakeholder group to finalize the 2012 and 2013 EITI Reports by the designated deadline of Dec. 31, 2014. The request for extension of the deadline was declined. It is expected that the reports will be finalized by mid-2015.
Through those representatives, CSOs influenced and engaged in the publication of the EITI report. When the EITI Report findings were published, CSOs raised these findings through the Media in press meetings in March 2013 for the 2009 EITI Report. CSOs led by the Publish What You Pay Indonesia also analyzed the Report and developed an open data portal providing use friendly information on the 2009 EITI Report (see more here: http://www.opendataekstraktif.com).

To increase public awareness on the EITI, CSOs also work to engage with local governments to improve the local government understanding and commitment towards the EITI, notably related to the information disclosure at the project level of oil and gas related data. Disclosing the information of project level data enables local government and CSOs to monitor the revenue obtained from each project and to ensure better compensation from extractive activities. Furthermore, the MSG, as one of EITI’s core body and actor, is the most appropriate instrument to monitor the revenue flow from extractive sector and lowers the risks of potential fraud and corruption.

**Contextualization of EITI Report to the Local Audience**

In order to ensure that CSOs are able to effectively participate in the MSG negotiation process, the EITI-MDTF Civil Society Direct Support Program was set up. Key objectives of this fund specifically included strengthening CSO capacity to understand the extractive industries, the EITI process and to analyze EITI reports and recommendations.

The Pattiro Institute (currently Artikel 33) – a member of the Publish What You Pay Indonesia network hosted the program of the coalitions which was supported by the Multi Donor Trust Fund of the EITI. The intervention in 2013 – 2014 supported five CSOs in five Indonesian provinces to conduct action research and communication activities. Five small grants were awarded to five local CSOs that aimed to contextualize the first Indonesian EITI report for local and national audiences through action research and communication activities.

**The Intervention**

Specifically, the steps of interventions and engagement were structured as follows:

- The EITI Indonesia secretariat carried out capacity building of CSOs on how to examine extractive industries’ revenue flow and open data, particularly at the sub-national and extractive government policies, value chains and the overall EITI process.
- Action Research was conducted in the West Kalimantan (EITI Nexus Spatial Transparency), Riau (Transparency on Oil & Gas Revenue and Social Payment), West Nusa Tenggara (Extractive Revenue and Social Development) and Southeast Sulawesi Provinces (Transparency in nickel extraction chain) by Publish What You Pay Indonesia in collaboration with local provincial CSOs. The objective of the Action Research was to contextualize the EITI report to sub-national audiences, to increase public awareness on the importance of transparency in the EI sector by cross-checking figures reported in the EITI reports with data provided by central and sub-national government entities. Findings from this action research were then examined and disseminated to national and sub-national audiences. PWYP, in collaboration with Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), created communication products such as SMS Gateway in Papua to familiarize local communities (tribal and indigenous people) with EITI report findings. Reflecting on the process, this research also found difficulties to access the local government data on production and revenue in the extractive industry sector.
- A preparation workshop was held in April 2013 where the five grantees received support on how to develop the research plan and how to ensure the quality of their action research and communication plan.
- News café and press conferences on specific EITI issues involving CSOs, youth, student, local government, journalists and media organizations were held in Papua. As a result, more people in Papua are aware of EITI reporting and process.
In addition, a public dissemination of the action research was conducted in June 2014 where the five grantees presented the key findings of the action research, as well as shared lessons from the implementation of the communication strategy.

- Facilitating MSG Meeting on Monitoring the Mining Licenses to Eradicate Corruption: PWYP Indonesia is strengthening CSO’s capacities in understanding the governance and revenue flow of mining (mineral and coal) and forestry sectors. In addition to that, PWYP also facilitated the CSO’s engagement in the Coordination and Supervision of Anti-Corruption Commission with the local government in 31 provinces on monitoring the mining licensing and company’s obligation on state revenue payment. This coordination and supervision is part of the National Movement on Natural Resources which is led by the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK), Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, and Local Government in 31 provinces (with more than 300 Districts).

**Results**

- One of the most important results of this intervention has been the greater awareness among citizens and CSOs on how to monitor EI activities. The capacity building as well as the action research raised public awareness on EI activities particularly among stakeholder, citizens and local government in local areas (at the provincial level).
- As a result of PWYP’s facilitation on monitoring the mining licenses to eradicate corruption, almost 1000 from 11,000 of mining licenses (IUP, Ijin Usaha Pertambangan) was revoked regarding a problem with the company’s administration, overlapping of concession areas, as well as regarding the Clean and Clear certification. More than 50% of the companies didn’t pay the reclamation and post mining funds deposit. In this part, CSO identified and found out the potential loss of revenue (*land rent*) from mineral and coal sector of almost 1,5 Triliun Rupiah from 2010 to 2013 occurred in 30 provinces.

**Political Economy Intervention**

The intervention (particularly the trainings of capacity building) has helped CSOs to gain and improve knowledge on revenue flow and public finance management issues of EITI. CSOs have started to examine the potential loss of extractive revenue of mining and coal sector and how to monitor it. The intervention has also improved their capacity to negotiate with other MSG stakeholder such us local government, oil and gas upstream bodies and etc.

This has allowed civil society to engage with government beyond the EITI process in the policy reform area, such as composing policy recommendations to the new “Kabinet Kerja/Working Cabinet” of Mr.President Jokowi regarding the extractives governance reform, giving input to the reformation team of oil and gas governance as well as proposing a civil society draft on the oil and gas law revision of the national parliament.

PWYP coalitions, its members and other CSO network are also monitoring the coordination and supervision of the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) of the mineral and coal sectors regarding the license audit, production and revenue stream, as well as the obligation of environmental protection and rehabilitation and post mining funds deposits in the mineral and coal operation process. On the communication side, Broad-based awareness campaigns were conducted through SMS Gateway, news café forum, press conferences and newsletters, infographics and citizens’ awareness of EITI processes has increased.

Greater awareness has led citizens to demand accountability from the government. For example, having learned how oil and gas operate in their area, the indigenous community of Talang Mamak living in the tropical rainforest in the regency of Indragiri Hulu in Riau Province requested several documents from the government including environment impact assessments, production data, and CSR funding to the local government. In other regions, the Dayak Indigenous Community in District of Sanggau-West Kalimantan, was trained to use drones as inclusive technology to map out and produce spatial data mapping.
The State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) in Jigawa State
By Jibrin Ali Giginyu, Adam Suleiman, and Helen Derbyshire, SAVI
Country: Nigeria

The Story
Nigeria has a federal system of government with significant powers devolved to state level. In 1999, the country returned to democratic rule after years of military dictatorship – but democracy is still in its infancy particularly at the state level. There is limited space for public policy-making responding to citizens’ concerns, and little transparency or accountability. Political parties are largely patronage machines. State Governments are constitutionally answerable to State Houses of Assembly (SHoA), but in most States these are very weak.

In recent years, there has been a burgeoning of formal civil society (CS) groups funded by donors seeking to promote improved governance. However, many are dominated by urban-based elites, have weak links to citizens, and shape themselves to donor priorities. Relations between State Governments and CS groups are often poor – and long-term observers agree that the impact of donor-funded CS advocacy has had no observable impact on what Governments do with public resources.

In this context, SAVI – a DFID funded program – is working to promote more responsive governments in ten states through a “Facilitated Partnership Approach” by organizing its own team in each state where it works. Members of the SAVI state teams come from diverse backgrounds including from government, civil society, media and private sector. The state teams conduct political economy analysis to identify issues that have salience for all stakeholders including government, citizens and civil society organizations. In their role as facilitators, state teams build local Advocacy Partnerships around these issues that include government officials, local civil society organizations, private sector and other citizens groups. SAVI State teams foster better working relationships between government and non-government stakeholders and build their capacity to think and work politically, work in effective strategic partnerships and drive forward reforms that make a difference to citizens’ lives. SAVI also provides partners with mentoring, technical support and complementary seed funding.

22 SAVI works closely with sister DFID-funded programmes working on “supply side” governance and sector reform in the same States.
One example of a SAVI-facilitated Advocacy Partnership is the Project Monitoring Partnership (PMP) improving the capacity of community based organisations in Jigawa State to monitor government projects in their localities, and to improve the relationship between state and non-state actors to deliver more efficient infrastructure projects.

The Intervention
When the governor in Jigawa state publicly committed to instituting transparency and accountability, the SAVI Jigawa State team recognized this commitment as an entry point for constructive citizen engagement with the government to improve service delivery and accountability. In 2011, the State team re-commenced working with PMP -- an existing coalition of about fifteen civil society organizations who were working on budget tracking issues but with limited success. SAVI provided multi-faceted support to PMP. It supported PMP to expand its membership to include Community Based Organizations (CBOs) motivated to track government projects directly affecting their own communities. It also built capacity of PMP members in practical budget and project monitoring, community engagement and evidence-based advocacy. SAVI also raised knowledge of PMP members on government systems and processes, and how to follow due process in challenging requests to government, including building a constructive relationship between PMP and the State government Due Process Office. A significant aspect of SAVI’s support was the role it played in strengthening the working relationship between PMP members, the media and the State Houses of Assembly. The impact of SAVI’s support to PMP and PMP’s own impact have built over time, as PMP’s confidence and credibility have grown, and citizens and government trust have built through successful and constructive engagement.

Results
There are many examples where PMP has facilitated citizen-led initiatives resulting in improved community level services in Jigawa state. PMP members have monitored government projects effectively and have brought irregularities to government’s notice, which were then addressed by the government. For example, a local CBO drew government’s attention to irregularities on a road construction in Babura Local Government Area (LGA). In response, government insisted on compliance by the contractor who built the road, ensured payment of proper compensation to people whose houses had been displaced, and rewarded the community by extending the road.

PMP members have also succeeded in getting the government to respond to their demands of infrastructure in their local communities. When citizens expressed their concerns on a radio phone-in program, the state government responded positively by constructing additional culverts in a new road project to avert floods from destroying rice farmlands. Similarly, the government completed construction of 25 wind-powered boreholes to serve nomadic Fulani herdsmen, and repaired boreholes in Kafin Hausa communities responding to local demands. The State Budget and Economic Planning Ministry mandated PMP to identify 27 communities in the state with serious water supply challenges, and then responded by constructing the boreholes in these communities. These are but a few examples of tangible results achieved by PMP.

SAVI initially engaged with this pre-existing coalition in 2009 but had later distanced itself because of ideological reasons.
Constructive Engagement

In all its work and partnerships, SAVI emphasizes constructive engagement with government rather than confrontation. This means working on issues that are a priority both for the State Government and for the citizens. It also means supporting partners to engage in smart and sensitive ways: understanding the policy/budget/project context they are seeking to influence; identifying key allies and stakeholders within government; understanding how and where to make their inputs most productively; and providing practical implementable suggestions rather than criticisms. Government officials begin to realise through experience that working constructively with credible CS groups can help them in solving some of their own challenges.

At the start of the SAVI programme in Jigawa State in 2009, government relations with CS groups were characterised by mutual suspicion. Six years on, constructive, evidence-based CS representation of citizens’ concerns to the State government has built the confidence, credibility and utility of CS groups, and helped the government to deliver on its own agenda for quality projects. As a consequence of SAVI support to PMP and others, credible CS groups are now part of Jigawa State Government sector planning teams; CS groups and the State government have worked together on formulating the State Comprehensive Development Plan and the ground-breaking State Gender Policy; and the State Budget and Economic Planning Directorates are routinely partnering with CS groups to get citizens’ inputs into annual budget formulation.

Political Economy Intervention

Political economy analysis of power structures and power relations, as well as stakeholder and issues analysis, are central to the SAVI programme. SAVI state teams are trained to conduct political economy analysis themselves, and to repeatedly update this information. They use this analysis to identify issues or processes to work on, which have traction both with the State Government and with citizens, and to bring together credible partners to work with around these issues.

SAVI state teams in turn support and mentor local partners to similarly “think and work politically”. Partners are encouraged to start their ambitions and activities small and go to scale gradually, using flexible and adaptive approaches, learning from experience, and gradually building their confidence, credibility and networks – resulting in higher ambitions and higher impact over time.
There is a growing consensus that although financial and technical issues matter, they do not constitute the only barrier to proper water provision across the world. In order to address challenges in service delivery in the water sector there is a need to focus on governance and accountability structures in the sector. Practitioners have increasingly explored social accountability mechanisms in order to address critical governance challenges in the sector (Ndwa, 2015). Social accountability approaches in the water sector have been implemented in a variety of ways, and include various dimensions. Most popularly, the establishment of water user committees, the compilation of citizen feedback, for example through score cards, and the establishment of joint mechanisms for monitoring have led to service delivery improvements in the water sector.

Feedback from users about the availability, functionality, quality and costs is crucial to advocate for better services. Citizens' feedback also helps set standards to monitor the provider’s performance. Citizen score cards have been deployed to compile feedback and to facilitate dialogue among the stakeholders to implement reforms. For example, in Uganda, in 2008 and 2009 citizen report cards surveyed users on the quality and availability of water services, and shared these results with various stakeholders. As a result of these interventions, the number of users encountering difficulties in accessing water decreased significantly and service providers began to adjust their practices to improve services in response to public feedback (Sirker et al. 2010). Similarly, in Nepal, citizens' feedback on quality and accessibility of water and sanitation services was collected through citizen report cards, and the results were shared in an interface meeting with local stakeholders, and at a national workshop. As a result of these interventions, a water supply monitoring mechanism coordinated by a representative of the water users was established at least in one locality (Prasai, 2013).

In the same vein, in Nigeria, a community scorecards approach was used to identify gaps in service provision and to facilitate interaction among various stakeholders to collectively develop a plan of action. This process has led to improved management and delivery of water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) governance in participating communities (WSP, 2011a). A similar approach has been used in Ghana (WSP, 2011b). The Tajikistan Supply and Sanitation Project in Tajikistan – a project funded by the GPSA – has also used a similar approach. The project aims to increase citizens’ participation in decision-making related to the water sector through the development of a citizen-based monitoring system and simplified indicators. It also plans to build capacities of service providers, local authorities and consumers in engaging with each other for better accountability. Recently, ICT has been used to provide more opportunities for citizens to directly engage with water service providers and to provide real time feedback, for example in Kenya’s capital city through the program MajiVoice.

Community monitoring of water services is another popular approach. For example, in Kampala, Uganda the community identifies shortcomings in access to services and performs an audit to identify issues with service delivery and potential breaches of accountability. They present their findings at meetings and forums with the service providers (Jacobson et al., 2010). In order to improve capacities of citizens and users to monitor service delivery, a number of projects have also established and strengthened user committees. For example, in Nicaragua, water user committees were organized to liaise with the government officials and other stakeholders to improve local water infrastructure (e.g. boreholes). These committees play an important role in monitoring service delivery and providing quality and effective community-based water management (Kreimann, 2010).

References


Sirker, Karen et al. 2010, “Improving Governance in water supply through social accountability, communication and transparency in Wobulenzi, Uganda”, Social accountability Notes, World Bank Institute


Water supply in Hebron
By Rasha Alyatim, Applied Research Institute Jerusalem and Joy Saunders, Integrity Action
Country: Palestine

The Story
Water shortages are common in the West Bank. Most residents only receive around 65 liters of water per day, 35% less than the 100 liters per day needed to guarantee constant access to water according to the World Health Organization. Around 5-10% of households in the West Bank remain unconnected to the water network. This has caused a reliance on water purchased from tanker trucks. This tanker water is often less sanitary and can cost up to 400 percent more than piped water.

The city of Hebron tries its best to fairly allocate water throughout the municipality to the approximately 167,000 inhabitants (2006 estimate), but is prevented from doing so because of Israeli control over Palestinian water resources, the allocation of water among Palestinian governorates from the Palestinian Water Authority and theft. This results in unpredictable water supply and therefore makes it difficult for the municipality to plan and distribute water fairly within the city. These circumstances have created extraordinary hardship for the community members, evident from the following statement of a community member: “We used bottled water for everything: for drinking, for showering, for washing. Sometimes we couldn’t cook because there was no water. We didn’t wash our clothes for 7-10 days. Sometimes we would stop the children from drinking water.” This was particularly difficult in the summer months where temperatures are consistently over 30 degrees Celsius.

As expected under these circumstances, in 2008 when the Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) and the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) in cooperation with Integrity Action (IA) called a community meeting to identify the most crucial public service issues, community members chose water. ARIJ in collaboration with IA implemented Community Integrity Building (the CIB approach) in the community. CIB is a locally driven, constructive and sustainable approach to identify, monitor and improve development projects and services. The main premise of the approach is that citizens mobilize and collaboratively engage with local authorities to learn, monitor, and collectively solve local problems to effectively meet the needs and expectations of communities. Through this approach, ARIJ and AMAN were able to work with communities and public officials throughout Palestine to monitor and improve public service projects that matter to citizens.

The Intervention
Once water shortages were identified as the most crucial issue for Hebronites, ARIJ trained community members to act as ‘community monitors.’ The purpose of the trainings was to introduce the monitors to the concept and tools of social accountability and participatory governance. The monitors also received technical training on various skills including data collection, citizen report cards, advocacy, and engagement with the media.

The monitors collected and analysed project documents and visited project sites to take photos. They also surveyed community members to assess their access to information, their level of engagement in the service provision process and the quality of services. The results of these surveys were then analysed and summarized by ARIJ staff. Community monitors shared their evidence-based findings with the public officials and service providers in multi-stakeholder joint working groups comprising community members, government officials and service providers. The establishment of this group was also facilitated by ARIJ and was called the Hebron Integrity Committee for Better Services. Public hearings were also held. Joint working groups and public hearings provided a way for citizens and officials to start a dialogue so that they could collaboratively resolve problems.

Concurrent with these interventions, AMAN worked to build the capacities of targeted local authority staff members to increase their understanding of anti-corruption, transparency, accountability and responsiveness to citizens. These trainings focused on ethics, codes of conduct, fair elections and engagement with citizens.
Results

After the intervention ended in February 2013, almost five years after its inception in 2008 -- residents reported that water availability was much better – and that they had enough water for 80% of the winter of 2012. Due to increased transparency around the water supply, chances of nepotism by government officials had also reduced tremendously. There had also been less cases of theft or sabotage from people stealing their neighbour’s water supply.

The Hebron Municipality also invested in two local radio shows to communicate with citizens on water issues, indicating greater responsiveness. Municipality officials go on air daily to announce how much water Hebron city has received on that day and how this share will be allocated between the different neighbourhoods. In addition to the daily announcement of the water schedule from public officials, citizens have the opportunity to call municipality officials live on air to discuss issues around water supply and lodge their complaints about any water shortages. In addition, civil society, community members and government officials have continued to work together through the Hebron Integrity Committee for Better Services to address other service delivery problems beyond the immediate issue of water supply.

Scaling Up

Integrity Action currently applies the Community Integrity Building approach in 11 post-war countries across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The approach has been successfully applied in settings that reflect different levels of literacy (such as Palestine versus Afghanistan), faster growing economies (Kenya and Timor-Leste) as well as countries at the lower end of the Human Development Index (Nepal and Afghanistan). The approach has also been used in rural as well as urban environments in countries that are heavily dependent on aid (Afghanistan and Palestine) as well as others that are more self-sufficient (Timor-Leste and Kenya). Results over the last five years illustrate how this approach can be scaled up to have national level impact. In doing so, Integrity Action has seen improvements to services and infrastructure that have benefited over 5 million people as well as positive policy changes, such as improved access to information or fairer distribution of services to citizens. The approach is also extremely cost-effective, costing on average less than 1% of the cost of the large service projects being monitored.

Scale to Integrity Action would mean improving services for at least 10% of a country’s population and obtaining wide geographical spread within those countries, so that citizens are empowered to ensure that policies are appropriate, information can be trusted and that fewer public funds are wasted.

Constructive Engagement

The CIB approach emphasizes constructive engagement between citizens and government officials through multi-stakeholder joint working group. However, setting up a joint working group in Hebron required much effort and organization, since before the intervention there had been no history of engagement between citizens and government. Many committee members were simply scared and hesitant to even talk directly with the government officials (as many members were poor and marginalized). Government officials also suspected that the committee members were “out to get” them on a personal level and were interested only in naming, shaming and blaming them without understanding the real problems. There were times, especially at the beginning of the project when the Municipality refused to work collaboratively with local civil society organizations and citizens.

Only after a sustained effort from the community members and ARIJ staff, who explained that they were looking to constructively engage and were not interested in naming and shaming, was it possible to bring citizens, government officials and service providers in one room. When both government officials and committee members communicated with each other in the joint working group, a better understanding of common problems emerged. The joint work plans and public hearings provided a platform for community members and government officials to communicate with each other. Through this process, government officials came to realize that they could think of citizens as partners in the process of change, where citizens could help officials by providing real-time feedback. As the mutual trust grew, the municipality even asked the committee to be its voice among citizens.

Building this type of trust was a major component of the intervention. Some level of trust had to be built before engagement between citizens and government could start and services could be improved. Experiencing improved and more transparent services and communication with government officials on a regular basis then strengthened citizen trust further. Nevertheless, considerable follow-up and effort has been put into keeping this constructive engagement going. The pressure came in different forms including repeatedly sending letters and contacting municipal officials about various issues. Civil society organizations also put up two public billboards that asked for fair and just water distribution in Hebron.
-D2-

Improving Social Accountability for the Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation

By Madina Aliberdieva, Oxfam Tajikistan
Country: Tajikistan

The story

In Tajikistan’s southern province of Khatlon – with a population of around 2.5 million - there is no shortage of stories about the lack of clean and accessible drinking water. In a recent gathering of women in April 2015 in the town of Kulyab,24 women discussed the issues of dry pipes, sick children, injured adults and impoverished villagers spending their last coins on intermittent water deliveries. Some spoke of injuries suffered by older community members trying to lug water containers hundreds of meters from the nearest tap—which itself was often dry. One woman miscarried a baby after falling over, water jug in tow. With more than 40 percent of rural Tajiks having no regular access to clean water, there is a clear urgency to improve water delivery systems.

The Parliament’s adoption of the law on drinking water and water supply in 2010 defined access to drinking water as a legal entitlement. But as the women in Kulyab would readily attest, service performance has not approximated the lofty expectations set forth by the law. The sector suffers from lack of finance and infrastructure problems, but at the same time the situation could be much improved with stronger governance, increased transparency and accountability of service providers.

In response to this challenge, Oxfam Tajikistan is undertaking four-year project Tajikistan Water Supply and Sanitation Project (TWISA) funded by the Global Partnership of Social Accountability to improve accountability and service standards for Khatlon’s water supply and sanitation sector. The implementation of the project started in 2014 and is initially focused on five pilot districts. By 2018 TWISA project aims to ameliorate water and sanitation conditions for close to 50,000 people in rural communities. Oxfam has collaborated with Consumer Union of Tajikistan -- a non-governmental organization formed in 2002 to protect consumer rights in the country.

The Intervention

TWISA aims to increase social accountability in relation to water supply by increasing citizens’ participation, in decision-making related to the water sector. It targets particularly women who so far have been under-represented in local governance. It also seeks to increase the transparency of service providers’ standards and processes, and supporting constructive engagement between regulators, operators and consumers to determine solutions.

The interventions include:

- Developing a citizen based monitoring system (CSBM) that will allow consumers to provide feedback to service providers and local authorities through regular engagement and dialogue. The system will help to closely connect people, service providers and the local government so that better communication allows service providers to be responsive to citizen requirements.

- Development of simplified indicators that will allow citizens to effectively monitor service providers’ performance. Given that the average consumer does not have deep expertise in the water sector, the indicators need to be easily usable and actionable by the people in the communities. The indicators aim to assess water service provider performance (quality, access & availability, quantity, reliability, affordability); the effectiveness and responsiveness of the individual and collective complaints mechanism; and responses to feedback collected via the citizen based monitoring system.

24 The meeting was organized by Consumers Union as part of this project and was attended by the heads of villages, heads of women groups and community based organizations, as well as representatives from the local authorities.
The TWISA project supported the creation of the National Working group comprising relevant experts from among state and non-state agencies to develop these indicators. A number of consultative field visits were organized by the working group members to obtain input of citizens. The Working Group plans to finalize the indicators by end of October 2015, followed by a process of consultations. All the key stakeholders, relevant state agencies and concerned public organizations will be involved in these consultations. Consumers Union supported by the members of the Working Group will then conduct a pilot testing of indicators.

- **Building capacities of the service providers, local authorities and consumers** in engaging with each other for better accountability. It is only through constructive engagement among all relevant stakeholders that collectively, challenges in rural drinking water supply and sanitation can be addressed. In order to constructively engage with the government, citizens need to learn about their rights and responsibilities. Similarly, service providers and government officials need to be able to manage, interpret and use citizen participation, communication and feedback.

So far Oxfam and the Consumer Union have organized public engagement and awareness raising workshops for 5 target district populations with the aim to teach them how to exercise their right to water and sanitation and to be responsible consumers. Oxfam and the Consumer Union have also organized 8 workshops to date on Improving Social Accountability Indicators in Tajikistan’s Water Supply and Sanitation with various stakeholders. The themes discussed in these workshops have included quality and safety of drinking water, reliability of water supply service, quantity of provision of drinking water, access and tariffs in drinking water service provision and water as a human right.

**Results**

While still in its early stages of implementation, some results have already started to emerge. For instance, TWISA has started to transform water provision services from a paradigm of being a closed, opaque and unaccountable system to a more open, transparent and collaborative system. Through negotiations, the signing of MoUs, and targeted capacity building, TWISA has exemplified that a new modus operandi of water sector accountability and governance is possible.

The changed approach is indicated by the fact that the Consumer Union and Oxfam were invited to the National Development Dialogue with donors and other bilateral and multilateral organizations in early 2015. The participation of non-governmental organizations in the dialogue speaks to the realization by the government that citizens’ representation in policy making is important. It is hoped that these changes would pave the way for effective consumer feedback to influence the framing of key issues in new or revised policies and programs on drinking water and sanitation for rural communities.

---

**Accountability Systems**

The TWISA project has also made an effort to link with the country’s accountability systems. The most notable linkage is through the office of Ombudsman – a national independent institution empowered to protect citizens’ rights for access to information. Ombudsman has met with Oxfam and the Consumer Union to understand the project’s goal and expectations and to explore potential mechanisms of collaboration. The Ombudsman also made a welcoming speech during the TWISA launch event in the capital of Tajikistan, which further underlined his office’s support for the project. The support from the Ombudsman’s office has been significant for TWISA. It has provided political legitimacy to the TWISA project and has ensured attention of decision-makers at different levels in the country.

The project has also linked up with the State Committee on Women and Family Affairs – a state agency that works on issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment. The Committee has publicly supported the project. The committee has representation in each district where TWISA operates, which has helped TWISA to create networks with women in these areas. Since improving women’s representation in water and sanitation sector is one of the major goals of TWISA, the alliance with this committee has been invaluable. In addition, support from the Committee also lends essential support to the TWISA project generally in the country and particularly with the women.
**Coalition Building**

TWISA engages with a large number of organizations who are engaged in water and sanitation sector in Tajikistan through TAJWSS Network of Stakeholders. The Network currently has a membership of 75 organizations and experts, and acts as a forum where all stakeholders can coordinate and communicate shared practices. It has also become a platform where tangible policy solutions and recommendations have been developed in a collaborative and participatory manner.

In particular, TWISA has extensively engaged with the Consumer Union of Tajikistan (CU). This engagement builds upon their previous collaboration. TWISA has benefited significantly from the CU’s orientation in consumer protection and experience in mobilizing volunteers and compiling information. It has ensured that the information collected is usable by government actors and operators. CU has also benefited from its engagement with Oxfam through TWISA, as it has gained access to more resources thus strengthening its legitimacy among stakeholders.

**Constructive Engagement**

Constructive engagement with government officials and other stakeholders is the most important aspect of TWISA, which has allowed the project to move forward successfully. TWISA built relationships with key agencies in the drinking water and sanitation sector and has engaged with key experts from relevant regulatory state bodies such as the Sanitary and Epidemiology Control Agency, the Agency for Anti-Corruption and Antimonopoly, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, and the Agency for Standardization to participate in working groups to jointly develop the social accountability indicators. Each agency has identified an expert to contribute to the standardization of indicators for the supply of drinking water and sanitation performance.

In addition, during the inception phase of the project, TWISA signed a detailed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the governors of the five districts. The MOUs specified the list of roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders as they agreed to facilitate each other in implementing various activities of the TWISA project.

Government officials both at the local and national level have strong incentives to collaborate with Oxfam and the Consumer Union in this project. The local governments have a significant infrastructure deficit, especially when it comes to water supply and sanitation, and they are usually ‘flooded’ with requests for improving water access to communities. Given the challenges local government officials face in responding to these requests, any project that promises to assist in the improvement of water and sanitation is welcomed by the government at local level. Similarly at national level, there is strong incentive to achieve better service delivery in water and sanitation.

However, the cooperation of the government officials for enhancing social accountability to achieve better results has been earned after a long engagement process. In the initial phase of the project, the state service provider felt that TWISA funds were better diverted to the construction of water systems and hardware as opposed to investing in civil monitoring systems given that the sector faces a serious lack of infrastructure and is underfunded. The absence of a hardware component, such as infrastructure fund to build water systems, also made it difficult to convince public authorities to engage on social accountability approaches. Moreover, there is limited knowledge among general public and respective authorities about the benefits and mechanisms of citizen participation. In the end, mediation by the World Bank staff and continuous effort of Oxfam and Consumer Union to engage led all stakeholders to agree on the importance of and support activities on establishing monitoring systems to improve outcomes in water and sanitation sector.
E. Municipal Services

Cities across the developing world are experiencing a rapid rate and scale of urbanization. The scale of urbanization puts immense pressure on public services, welfare and human infrastructure development, which create challenges in the management of urban affairs. Given that urban economic activities are dependent on infrastructure, such as roads, transportation, solid waste management and affordable housing, improving service delivery in urban areas is especially urgent. Moreover, the distribution of services in urban areas is also usually skewed; residents of poorer urban areas face significantly more challenges in accessing basic services than their more affluent counterparts.

In an effort to improve services, many countries experiencing urbanization have experimented with social accountability in improving governance. One of the flagship social accountability programs targeting municipal services is the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission in India. This project emphasizes community participation, transparency and accountability to citizens in its efforts to improve municipal governance. The initiative has used a multi-pronged approach including citizen report cards to generate citizen feedback about the quality of municipal services, participatory budgeting so that citizens can directly participate in the allocation of resources, and social audits that allow citizens to monitor the progress of various initiatives (ASCI, n.d.). Another similar project in two cities in India and Cambodia used a combination of strategies such as citizen mobilization, capacity building and participation in planning and monitoring. The project also developed citizen charters, and encouraged pro-active information disclosure by governments, and helped set up redress mechanisms in partnership with municipalities. The project supported the establishment of neighborhood committees that monitored municipal services and organized interface meetings with the city authorities.

Many countries have used other approaches similar to citizens report cards. For example in Zimbabwe, the Training and Research Support Center (TARSC) and the Civic Forum on Housing (CFH) undertook a fact-finding exercise in which citizens of different neighborhoods in the cities participated in identifying problems and recommending actions for communities to improve solid waste management. The fact-finding was followed by interface meetings between civil society and government officials and private sector (TARS and CFH, 2013). The Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) initiated a pilot intervention in Jaipur, India, called MyCity. These interventions crafted space for citizen engagement. The program implemented Citizen Report cards to gather feedback from citizens on the status and quality of services and constructed Public Services Index to generate ward level report cards of urban services provided by the Municipal Corporation. Citizen report cards where also utilized to gather feedback from citizens on the status and quality of services. Additionally community meetings with service providers were organized to resolve specific urban service delivery issues. They also supported the establishment of Citizen Action Groups.

This approach has been used in slums as well. Slum Dwellers International (SDI) has developed a flexible, community-driven process called enumeration whereby data collection on access to water and sanitation and other relevant services is conducted by community members, often in collaboration with local academics and professionals reflecting the problems faced by those living in slums. These enumerations have been completed in slums and informal settlements in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Namibia, among others. This process has led to significant results. For example, in Zimbabwe, the enumeration process facilitated an agreement between the residents of the slum Magada, their community organization and the municipal government to work together to improve the conditions, for example, of the settlement’s road layout and sanitation systems (Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012).

Some interventions have employed ICT to gather and consolidate citizens’ feedback on the quality and access of municipal services. For example, in Argentina the Civic Association for Equity and Justice (ACIJ) and Wingu: Technology for Nonprofits joined with social and community organizations to launch an online platform to monitor and oversee public works and public services in the slums of the city of Buenos Aires. The platform called the Paths of the Slum allows residents of the slum to follow the development of public works projects and to identify gaps in services and problems associated with access to municipal services. Residents can also use this platform to request public information (McKirdy, 2015).
References


Bandyopadhayay, K. (2014) “Learning Social Accountability Together: Civil Society facilitated South-South cooperation in India, Bangladesh and Cambodia” Institute of Development Studies


Placing People at the Heart of Change
By Cecilia Forrestal, Community Action Network
Country: Ireland

The Story
Dolphin House is Dublin’s second largest public housing flat complex. Built in 1957, it sits on 18.5 acres and comprises 436 homes (made up of 392 flats in 6 blocks and 44 one room bedsits for senior citizens). Many of the flats are small and lack private open space, energy efficiency and accessibility. The estate has a very poor physical design with a lot of unusable open space and inadequate play facilities for children and young people. There is a foul waste-water smell and a constant problem of waste water coming back up into sinks and baths in some flats. There are also issues of dampness and overcrowding where children are sharing a bedroom with a parent in some flats.

The area was earmarked for regeneration in 2005 and a Joint Regeneration Board was set up to oversee the regeneration process. The Board included locally elected representatives, community organizations, local authority officials and residents. When Ireland went into recession in 2008 the regeneration was postponed indefinitely, leaving residents with no hope of any redress to their housing conditions despite ongoing meetings of the Joint Regeneration Board.

Intervention: CAN’s Role in solving the problem – Establishing and supporting RRIAG
CAN established a representative group of Dolphin House residents and community activists — called Rialto Rights in Action Group (RRIAG). CAN also supported and gave direction to RRIAG with a goal to empower residents to challenge poor housing conditions. CAN worked directly with the RRIAG to fully understand the underlying causes of the poor housing conditions. This meant creating an environment of respect and trust where people could speak freely. Sharing their stories moved them from the individual experience of powerlessness, shame and isolation to one of frustration, anger and inquiry into the issues they shared.

In addition, CAN supported RRIAG to gather baseline data, through simple questionnaires, photographs, and scientific evidence collected by licensed engineers, microbiologists and architects about the housing conditions. This data gave a rigor to the campaign and a confidence to residents to exercise their voice. The baseline data also informed indicators to monitor housing conditions. CAN also facilitated residents to engage in a process of Power Mapping to analyze the political context of their housing issues. Once the mapping established that the Minister for Housing was the nominated Government person who had the capacity to address the serious structural issues in Dolphin House, CAN struggled to ensure meaningful dialogue between them and the RRIAG.

Powerful evidence consisting of stories of the people backed statistically linked poor housing to poor health and education standards. Residents presented this evidence in a series of five public hearings. These hearings took place in the full glare of the media. As a result, poor housing conditions could now be framed as breaches of human rights according to international treaties. CAN also facilitated RRIAG to use the media to disseminate strong messages in high profile events with an aim to put pressure on local and national government to provide necessary political support and legitimacy.

Results
There have been significant, measurable outcomes from the process. The most concrete result is that the living conditions of Dolphin House residents have improved. A successful programme of refurbishment of the 40 flats worst affected was completed in 2014. Moreover, there is now an agreed Regeneration Plan in place and in
process. The fact that the area has now been prioritised for regeneration, especially in this time of recession, illustrates just how effective the campaign has been.

This intervention has also had spillover effects inspiring a coalition that seeks to achieve systematic change in housing conditions of poor people across Ireland. In July 2014, 20 communities along with housing, legal and advocacy experts lodged a Collective Complaint to Council of Europe stating that poor housing conditions violate key articles of the Revised European Social Charter, which Ireland signed up to in 2000. The complaint is an attempt to scale up the intervention to address the policy issues that perpetuate sub-standard housing as experienced in Dolphin House. It seeks to bring about system change in relation to administrative, policy and legal frameworks that underpin social housing. The complaint was found admissible in March 2015 and has forced the state to respond to the Council of Europe on the policy issues in question thereby creating a new accountability system for public housing tenants to use.

**Political Economy Intervention**

The political economy analysis framed the intervention to identify the main actors in government who had the capacity to address the issue. The whole process has been hugely transformative for residents, profoundly impacting on their self-esteem, identity and civic engagement. It allowed them to take power over their situation and in so doing to publically claim the right to participate in the decisions that impact on their lives.

Independent scientific and architectural evidence finally led to the acknowledgement by the government that the main causes of the dampness, sewerage, mould etc. were structural – cold walls, insufficient ventilation and insulation and overcrowding, ending the myth that it was residents’ fault. In other words, evidence gave them additional sources of power to hold their own within discussions on causes and solutions to their issues. This resulted in a huge shift in power dynamics from the perspective of tenants.

Following the intervention, residents through RRIAG now participate in the Joint Regeneration Board with an enhanced sense of their own power. They are no longer outside the system. They are consulted and included in decision making regarding short and long term plans and on corresponding timelines and targets in Dolphin House in a respectful and equal way. They have regular meetings with the Local Authority and relevant government departments through the board and monitor progress.

**Coalition building**

This campaign is in itself a huge coalition and would not have been as successful any other way. The core coalition partners are residents, community organisations in the local area and CAN. This coalition is called Rialto Rights in Action and it collectively plans, acts, reviews, learns and acts again at every stage in the campaign.

Another important coalition member was the media, which was engaged by CAN as its support to RRIAG. Dolphin House had been the subject of negative media in the past, and had been associated with anti-social behaviour, drugs etc. Before the intervention, RRIAG was cautious of any involvement with media of any sort. However, in the end, media played a significant role in shaping priorities for political action with consistent coverage of appalling substandard housing conditions, a lack of effective remedy, waste of public money in terms of poor quality and inappropriate maintenance, serious and costly health impacts on children, adults and communities, communicated at many levels. All public hearings were covered by print, radio and TV. Media attention, in turn, created public pressures and provided an incentive to the government to respond.

Other important members of the coalition were human rights experts who validated the evidence and experience and put it in a bigger context. In so doing they added clout to the voice of residents. Having a bigger national and international coalition calling for a reasonable response to appalling conditions put additional pressure on the powers that be to engage in a way that would be seen to be acceptable to a wider audience.

This large scale coalition was essential as it strengthened the hand of residents to take and exercise power, and situated the voice of the residents in a broader and national and international context – one that has changed the political salience of this local issue. The people involved had a passion for the campaign and a belief in the valid claims of the residents. However, of equal importance was their ability and willingness to come in behind residents, supporting them rather than speaking and acting on their behalf. If that had been otherwise, the coalition would not have been as successful in developing residents’ sense of themselves as citizens.
F. Extractive Industries

Industries that extract non-renewable natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals and timber have largely fallen short of their development promises of sustainable local development and poverty reduction. One of the primary reasons for this lack of success is the lack of accountability of different actors, including governments and private companies. Large amounts of revenue are involved in the extraction of natural resources. If institutional arrangements are not in place to manage this revenue in a transparent and accountable manner, there is a serious potential for increased corruption, and loss of opportunity to use this wealth to implement poverty reduction strategies (United Nations, 2012). Moreover, extractive processes can negatively impact communities where they are performed, for example by destroying the environment and social infrastructure. Poor, remote and politically marginalized communities are at a greater risk of this negative impact. Lack of accountability in extractive processes has often been cited as a key factor in triggering, escalating or sustaining violent conflicts around the globe (United Nations, 2012).

Given this serious situation, international community has accelerated its efforts to improve accountability in the extractive industries sector in the last few decades. There are a number of international initiatives underway that aim to achieve this goal, including the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Publish What You Pay Coalition and Transparency International’s Revenue Transparency Index. The role of social accountability initiatives has consistently increased in exacting accountability within these initiatives, as well as in other programs.

A number of tools have been used including multi-stakeholder monitoring and evaluation, participatory budgeting and expenditure tracking of royalties generated by EI. In Peru, for example, the project ‘Improving Municipal Investment’ was launched in 2005. The project provides information to CSOs and builds their capacities to systematically monitor royalty transfers and municipal investments. CSOs also make attempts to promote open dialogue between various stakeholders and citizens. As a result of this program, mayors of communities where the program has been implemented have held public meetings to respond to citizens’ questions (IFC, 2011). Similarly, in Guatemala, environmental monitoring committees in communities affected by mining operations were established in order to support community monitoring of mining companies’ operations. The program was awarded a prize by the Latin American mining organizations as the region’s most innovative effort to include local communities in mining operation.

Similar forms of multi-stakeholder groups have also been established at national levels. For example, in Lao PDR, a multi-stakeholder group was established to provide advice on gender-sensitive and social inclusive development in the mining sector. In Chad and Cameroon as well, an International Advisory group – a multi-stakeholder group comprising civil society organizations – was established to monitor a large extractive project. The group played a significant role in monitoring the overall progress in implementing the project and continuously assessed the impact of the project on environment and communities. It also presented recommendations to allay issues that arose in these areas. The group fostered continuous dialogue among various stakeholders and led to the systematic inclusion of civil society in its monitoring of the project.

In some contexts, capacity building of parliamentary committees has improved parliamentary oversight of EI revenues, leading to transparency and greater accountability of executive and extractive companies. For example, a multi-phased capacity building initiative in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen was launched in 2007 with the aim to strengthen legislative oversight of government revenues by improving the quantity, quality and timeliness of information on government revenues (GOPAC website).

References

Global Organization Of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC), Global Conference, 2008 Findings, GOPAC Website

“Participatory Environmental Monitoring, Guatemala,” Case study, CommDev IFC Website


“Oil, Gas, Mining, Sustainable Community Development Fund,” CommDev, PowerPoint Presentation, May 17, 2007

Civil Society’s Role in the EITI Process
By Seidou Ariji and Margherita Castelli, Publish What you Pay (Niger)
Country: Niger

The Story

Extractives is one of the most fundamental sectors of Niger’s economy; it is a priority sector of its Poverty Reduction and Accelerated Growth Program. Niger has five large provinces rich in mineral resources. The major challenge in the area of extractive industries is to strengthen governance in the management of resources and improve transparency of the revenue flows.

The Nigerien government has taken several steps to that end. It became an official candidate country of EITI in August 2007, which is an independent, internationally agreed upon, voluntary standard for creating transparency in the extractive industries and requires transparency in payments made by companies and revenues received by governments from country’s extractive resources. Part of the requirements include publishing an EITI report the present this data in an accessible form. As EITI member country Niger has produced several EITI reports covering the period 2004-2012. Reports covering the period post-2012 are underway. Niger achieved EITI compliant status – recognized as having fulfilled EITI’s requirements in March 2011. Niger represents the Francophone Africa Group on the EITI International Board.

Niger’s constitution also provides protections for transparency of financial flows within extractive industries. The constitution identifies a number of financial transactions that must be made public in an adequately disaggregated fashion. The constitution also mandates that 15 percent of the revenue generated from extractive industries flow back into the communities where it originated. It also suggests that investments be made in priority areas such as health, education, livestock and agriculture.

The EITI process is overseen by a Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) that is made up of government, companies involved in extraction of natural resources, and civil society representatives. The MSG develops the work plan, decides on the format of the reporting template, produces the EITI reports and ensures that the data is comprehensive and publicly accessible.

EITI process requires that civil society is actively engaged as a participant in all aspects of MSG’s activities and contributes towards public debate. While this places civil society in a powerful place to influence decision-making, it is possible only if the civil society has the capacity and knowledge to influence the process, and effectively and forcibly represent citizens’ interests and preferences. Participation in the EITI process requires a specialized skill set including proficiency in technical issues on extractive industries and knowledge of finance and accounting, among other skills.

To that end, the World Bank initiated the EITI-MDTF Civil society Direct Support Program in Niger. Niger was the first country to receive funding from the EITI MDTF fund for the country’s EITI Civil Society Capacity Building related activities. Within that program, ROTAB (Réseau des organisations pour la transparence et l’analyse budgétaire (Network of organisations for transparency and budget analysis) implemented extensive capacity building activities for CSOs. ROTAB is a network of various organizations, associations and trade unions in Niger. It is also the local chapter of the global campaign Publish What You Pay (PWYP), which campaigns for transparency and accountability in extractive industries.

The specific objectives of the capacity building activities and the specific constraints the CSOs in Niger faced were identified during a series of national and regional CSO consultations. The aim of capacity building activities was to improve knowledge of CSOs on EITI, of the EI value chain and the extractive industry overall; and enable
CSO representatives to communicate and share knowledge on EITI implementation with various stakeholders including citizens.\textsuperscript{25}

The main element of the intervention was the workshops for the CSOs that were held in Niamey, the capital and in three extractives regions. The use of local language was part of the strategy as most of the population does not understand French.

Workshops also focused on training in communication and advocacy skills so that CSOs can communicate effectively on EI governance and transparency issues.

Awareness and educational outreach was also conducted to disseminate the knowledge to citizens more widely through caravans and public gatherings in extractives areas. Press conferences were held and visual materials like posters and cartoons were promoted, presenting international, national and regional best practices. These various techniques were used to illustrate the importance of the EI sector in Niger’s economy and the need for greater transparency in the management of EI resources.

Results
As a result of these activities local, regional and the national population and civil society are sensitized on EI issues and are able to more effectively participate in the EITI debate. Populations around extractive industry areas are advocating for full and regular transfers of financial revenues and are demanding that EI revenue is invested in the development sector. Enhanced engagement of civil society and citizens has ensured that EI governance is placed on the national agenda.

People particularly those who live in extractive areas are seeking a fair share of the revenue and monitoring environmental issues such radiation (in the North where uranium is exploited), damages caused by cyanide and mercury in the west of the country where Gold is produced through industrial and artisanal mining.

There is an increased knowledge and public awareness of the significance of EITI, on the EI value chain, including concepts such as contract transparency, exploration licenses, fiscal regime and taxation in EI and corporate social responsibility. Today in Niger, ordinary citizens can elaborate on governance challenges of the extractive industry. Populations around extractive industries are advocating for the full and regular transfers of financial revenues they should have according to the national subnational transfer scheme. For the first time the awareness campaigns have reached local populations.

Civil society has also gained traction and more political clout in the EITI issues. Local authorities have begun to work with CSOs and perceive these actors as legitimate development partners, which was not the case before. While this intervention has helped tremendously with strengthening CSO capacity, it is a long term process and takes time. Specifically, CSOs in Niger need more support to implement knowledge acquired through awareness campaigns.

\textsuperscript{25} In consultations it was recognized that CSOs also need capacity building to monitor the implementation of the contracts in relation to provisions regarding environmental issues such as lands restoration, and water quality.
Political Intervention

The intervention by PWYP and ROTAB has led to significant impact on the political environment. Civil society and citizens have been empowered to ask for their rights. They know that they are entitled to certain information and they are more capable of asking for it than before the intervention. They are also aware of the provisions regarding channeling of EI revenue to the development sector. The government can no longer ignore citizens’ demands for more information and equitable distribution of EI revenue. A number of episodes in the country demonstrate this change.

For example, CSO and communities around extractive areas played an important role in the quest for a fair deal by the Niger government during the renegotiation of contracts in the uranium sector. Several demonstrations were held in Niamey and other cities in Niger demanding AREVA, the French company exploiting uranium, to honor the 2006 mining code and increase the percentage of royalties paid to Niger. In Arlit, the main uranium-producing city, women demonstrated for the improvement of living conditions of the local population, particularly in terms of access to hospitals, which are reserved only to mine workers and their families.

Accountability Systems

The intervention appealed to larger accountability systems in the country to promote its objectives of transparency and accountability in the EI. For example, a group of parliamentarians called the Parliamentary Network on Extractive Industries (PNEI) participated in training sessions carried out by PWYP and ROTAB, who have further reinforced the principles of transparency in EI through their status in the parliament. According to the Constitution, through the “oral question procedure,” members of Parliament have the right to request the Mining and Oil Minister to appear before the Parliament and respond to questions. Taking advantages of this provision, CSOs referred to the Network to gather relevant information and clarifications from the government in relation to governance issues of the extractive sector.

In addition, trained CSOs also collaborated with HALCIA (Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées) – a national body to fight against corruption established by the government -- and the National Human Rights Commission that are making efforts to improve good governance.

Despite these collaborations, there is insufficient emphasis on the EI in Niger’s overall accountability systems. The national EITI secretariat is not focused on CSOs and how resources from the EI can benefit local populations.

Coalition Building

The initiative listed the support of a number of partners. Media, journalists and academia attended training activities. Several lecturers from Niamey University and universities located in mining regions (Zinder, Maradi) acted as trainers/facilitators during the workshops. Local and traditional leaders also benefited from these trainings as members of local councils. In addition to improving technical capacity of CSOs in EI issues, the training workshops also aimed to promote solidarity among coalition members so as to reinforce the spirit of partnership and collaboration.

However, the private sector – an important stakeholder in the EI -- did not participate in these events despite several attempts to get them involved. Private companies refused to send representatives to training sessions in spite of repeated invitations. Private sector representatives were also reluctant to respond to media queries in the design of radio programs. Private sector, however, did participate in the World Bank-facilitated EI consultations along with government and CSOs.

Moreover, local authorities have not been included in the discussions and efforts to improve transparency and accountability in the EITI. For a more effective approach, local authorities need to participate more thoroughly in the EITI process.
G. Youth

Children and young people are often precluded from direct participation in many public processes of accountability. Sometimes social norms prohibit them from participating directly in decision-making activities (Marc et al., 2012), and they have to count on adults to make decisions on their behalf. As a result, some issues that are of direct relevance for youth may remain unaddressed, or are not emphasized in decision-making processes. Participation of youth in social accountability activities can help alleviate this deficiency as young people participate in shaping and monitoring decisions that affect them and stakeholders are able to respond directly to young people’s engagement at the local and national levels. In addition, outcomes in health, education and nutrition are expected to improve when young people participate in exacting accountability (Davis, et al., 2014). Moreover, participation of youth strengthens the principle of broad citizen participation and therefore has an intrinsic value. Such participation can also form a foundation for active citizenship for youth; as youth learn to be drivers of social change, their participation in social accountability prepares them to question and influence decision-making within their communities and government (McGee and Greenhalf, 2011).

Recently, a number of programs around the world have attempted successfully to involve youth in the processes of engagement with government officials. These interventions have taken widely different approaches. In Siera Leone, for example, Insightshare in collaboration with local communities trained youth in video production, who in turn trained their peers. This group of young people made videos about public service delivery issues in their communities. In many communities, young people were able to attract government officials to pay attention to these issues and collaborate with youth in solving them. In Kenema district, for example, youth played an important part in raising awareness about waste management and then collaborated with the local council to find a solution in the shape of construction of permanent garbage sites all over the city. Some youths who were part of the process have also been elected to decision-making positions in local governance. In Liberia, a similar approach has been used to bring young people’s concerns to broader groups (Kamara and Swarray, 2011).

In another innovative project, Plan Senegal implemented the program Governance Program Partnership Agreement, with an aim to increase the participation of young citizens in the process of evaluation, planning, and implementation of local development planning. The project supported the establishment of children and youth’s groups known as school councils. Led by an executive office of six young people who were democratically elected by the class delegates in a general assembly, school councils provided a platform to children and young people from where they could participate not only in school management but also in local planning development committees (The young people from Louga, Senegal, 2011).

In Tanzania, Save the Children has supported children in seven districts to come together in more than 900 Children’s Councils. These councils have advocated for better planning and budgeting for children both at district and national levels. As part of these activities children have met with district officials to present their priorities to be integrated into district council plans and budgets. As a result, six out of the seven district councils planned for increased resource allocation to activities directly related to children (Couzens and Mtengeti, 2012).

Various projects have also integrated youth participation in traditional social accountability activities to emphasize accountability for outcomes important for youth. For example, in Ghana youth have participated in budget preparation and tracking, and have advocated for investments in child welfare and projection. In Kenya, youth have used social audits for better management and accountability in the use of public resources (Mwawashe, 2011).

The use of ICT in social accountability activities is potentially even more useful for youth, as their use of such technologies is much higher than in older generations. They are also more savvy in using newer technology. Taking advantage of this, Plan Uganda implemented an SMS-based system to tackle the problem of teacher absenteeism in schools. The project introduced mobile phones, through which students could report teacher and student absenteeism/attendance. The scheme has resulted in near elimination of teacher absenteeism and an almost 80% reduction in pupil absenteeism (Davis, et al. 2015).
References:


The young people from Louga, Senegal and Fall, S. (2011) “As of now, we are stakeholders in local governance” in Young citizens: youth and participatory governance in Africa, The International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK
The Story
Nigeria is one of the most populous countries in Africa with one of the largest populations of youth in the world. Identifying and addressing issues that would enhance the lives of youth can be a driving factor in improving overall national development. While Nigerian youth are ambitious, enthusiastic and promising they lack a platform where they can communicate with the decision makers about what is important to them, and encourage citizen-led development.

In this context, U-Report provides a much-needed space for youth, in fact every citizen, to speak out on what is happening in communities across the country. It empowers them to establish and enforce new standards of transparency and accountability in development programming and services.

It is an SMS based program. First U-Report program became operational in Uganda in 2011 and today the program operates in 15 countries with over a million people sending or receiving SMSs every week. In Nigeria, U-Report was initiated in early 2014 and now has a membership of over 1,000,000 people.

The Intervention
Anyone in Nigeria who has an access to a mobile phone can sign up to receive and send SMS discussing a wide range of development issues -- or become a ‘U-Reporter’ -- by sending a text message to a toll-free number and submitting a few personal details.

A number of issues are discussed in U-Report. UNICEF’s team and a group of partner organizations meet regularly to determine the issues to be discussed on U-Report. When a topic is decided, UNICEF sends a question via SMS text to U-Reporter, who can respond either with a simple menu-based reply or with personal messages. The UNICEF team analyzes and interprets the responses, and shares the results with the reporters often following up with additional questions or suggestions. The results of the poll are also widely shared on the U-Report platform on the Internet e.g. http://nigeria.ureport.in and various social networking sites.

A number of issues have been discussed in Nigeria through U-Report including impact of violence and insecurity on education; violence against children; issues in health including HIV and sanitation; and human trafficking. The questions do not only ask for information (e.g. on dropout rates or incidents of violence), but also provide information (e.g. about citizens’ rights and legal frameworks that protect citizens). The questions also seek opinions on how various problems can be solved, and engage citizens in monitoring performance of various programs and initiatives (e.g. by asking them to share their opinion on how a specific service is working in their community).

The results of the poll questions can be disaggregated by gender, geographical location, and other demographic factors, and have been shared with relevant government agencies. The data generated can and has been used in various ways. It helps governments and donors prioritize how the limited resources are spent, where and on what issues, and how programs can be tweaked to improve their effectiveness. It also allows governments to address issues of quality and potential misuse of resources, and respond more effectively to crises thereby acting as a catalyst for more accountable and responsive government.

Results
U-Report has played a significant role in many different areas across the world. In addition to improving monitoring, accountability and transparency of development programming and services, U-Report played a role in identifying and verifying cholera, Ebola and typhoid outbreaks in various countries in Africa thereby...
increasing the efficiency of response. U-Reporters partnered with World Bank to stop banana bacterial wilt disease by pinpointing geographical areas where the disease was spreading and by disseminating critical information to farmers and community quickly to stop the spread.

In terms of a specific intervention in Nigeria, U-Report played a critical role in eliciting government response to improve security for children attending school. During March, 2015 U-Report asked 163,000 U-Reporters a series of questions to understand the impact of insecurity on children’s access to school in the post-conflict north eastern area of the country, and solicit citizens’ opinions on how the situation could be better addressed. In the space of two days, over 20,000 people responded to these questions and a total of 80,000 messages were received to multiple questions.

The exercise had multi-pronged impact. First, the overwhelming response of the citizens convinced the Director of the National Orientation Agency (DOA) – the agency tasked with raising awareness of government policies and providing timely and credible feedback to the citizens – that it is a significant problem, who in turn brought it up as it a significant issue within the Nigerian national government. He used the crowd-sourced data to petition government, specifically the Ministry of Public Service for funds to support a community protection program to improve security situation so that children could go to school. Second, the data disaggregated into districts provided much needed information for effective programming.

---

**Constructive Engagement**

U-Report became possible and continues to operate successfully because of strong constructive partnership between state and non-state actors. This partnership is manifested in many different ways. The results of the polls and the disaggregated data generated by the responses are shared with relevant government agencies. Many government officials have become U-Reporters themselves so that they receive the results and communicate with citizens directly. They are able to tap into local knowledge to learn the local and personal impact of policy and development interventions.

---

**Coalition Building**

A strong coalition across a number of sectors in Nigeria has been a significant factor in U-Report’s success in Nigeria. UNICEF Nigeria has worked closely with a number of partners. National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) – a government organization whose mission is to encourage and develop common ties among the youths of Nigeria – is UNICEF’s strong coalition partner for U-Report. NYSC has a strong network across the country with people of all tribes, social and cultural backgrounds, which has helped UNICEF reach all groups even those that have previously remained marginalized. Public support of U-Report by NYSC has also lent the program political and social legitimacy. UNICEF has also collaborated with other youth organizations including the World Organisation of the Scout Movement, The World Association of Girl Guides & Girl Scouts and religious and traditional leaders.

U-Report also presents a great example of collaboration among civil society, government and private sector. Media and telecommunication service providers in the country including Airtel, MTN, Glo and Etisalat have provided invaluable support to U-Report to scale up registration and increase impact. The use of this technology is still in the test phase but seems promising.
III. Concluding Reflections

Through these case studies, we have presented initiatives that have applied the social accountability approach in varied ways. Some approaches focused on building technical capacity of civil society organizations and citizen groups, while others emphasized the communication and advocacy capacities of civil society organizations.

Many interventions aimed to create or support a feedback loop between citizens and governments. In most cases, data was proactively collected by citizens or citizen groups, for example in the case of Integrity Action’s intervention in Hebron, Palestine and CAN’s intervention in Ireland and then shared with relevant government authorities. In other cases, the intervention focused on information dissemination and on making it easier for the citizens to monitor government performance by creating accessible avenues for feedback provision.

These interventions have led to extensive results that range from improvements in infrastructure, increases in government spending in social sectors, targeting of government expenditures in sectors favored by citizens, to greater awareness among citizens about the public service issues and promulgation of relevant legislation providing access to citizens in decision-making.

An overview of these programs also provides valuable lessons for the five dimensions of social accountability we highlighted at the beginning of this report.

Constructive Engagement
In most of the cases, initiating and maintaining constructive engagement between citizens and governments was a challenge, but when overcome also provided substantial benefits. In many contexts where social accountability programs were initiated, there had been no history of citizen-state engagement. Citizens did not trust government officials and government officials were suspicious of citizens’ motives perceiving their demands of accountability as exercises in naming and shaming.

Many interventions, however, had constructive engagement as an essential component, and provided space for this engagement through different mechanisms. They formed joint working groups, conducted structured interface meetings and combined workshops with all stakeholders, and when required substantiated these formal mechanisms with informal engagement.

Most frequently, persistence was described as crucial in building constructive relationship between citizen groups and government officials. Continuous and open communication in a safe and non-confrontational environment among all stakeholders led to collaborative relationships. Communication also encouraged government officials to understand that engagement with citizens can lead to solution of common problems, such as improvement in service delivery outcomes. Government officials also came to understand that open communication can sensitize citizens on resource constraints and can help them manage citizens’ expectations. As the communication continued in many cases, mutual trust between stakeholders grew. In some cases, as in Tajikistan’s TWISA project, mediation by a third party (in this case World Bank) supported this engagement.

The case studies also identify other strategies that can encourage citizens and governments to engage constructively with each other. For example, the education project in Moldova shows that involving government early in the design and implementation of programs builds trust with the government. The Palestinian and Irish cases illustrate the significance of evidence-based communication; when communication is based on data there is less room for stakeholders to suspect each others’ motives.

It is also helpful to find intermediaries, as in the case of Malawi where traditional leaders acted as mediators between government and citizens, as they had convening power and influence over government officials as well as high legitimacy with the citizens. In some cases, it is helpful to take direct measures to sensitize government
officials to the needs of the citizens and to the importance of transparency and community engagement, for example through visits to the community, as was done in DRC.

Political Intervention
Almost all interventions discussed in this publication were framed by analysis of power dynamics and political context. These analyses identified the issues and identified the important stakeholders. Many of these interventions also contributed to changing these dynamics.

In many contexts where these interventions were implemented, citizen groups have become more vocal in demanding change and accountability from relevant service providers. In DRC, for example, the Parent Teacher Association has become more engaged in financial management of services. Similarly, in Indonesia and Niger, following the training on EITI issues, civil society has started to examine revenues more closely and communities have started to demand information regarding environmental impact of EI activities.

In some contexts, political dynamics have changed to provide citizen groups a permanent place at the decision-making table. In Tajikistan, the Consumer Union and Oxfam were invited to the National Development Dialogue to discuss future development agenda. In Ireland, residents participate in the Joint Regeneration Board that monitors the progress of the government buildings where they live, along with relevant government departments.

Coalition Building
Coalition building formed the core of some of the interventions discussed in the publication. In Nigeria, SAVI’s approach is based on forming pro-accountability coalitions that have fluid memberships; members are free to join and leave at their discretion. In DR case also, coalition-building lay at the heart of the intervention. The whole focus of the intervention was to bring relevant actors together to give pro-reform actors more legitimacy and political support.

In other interventions as well, coalition building played a major role. Coalition actors ranged from media, academia, citizen groups (like the Consumer Union in Tajikistan), and local civil society organizations among others. These members shared expertise and resources and provided each other with legitimacy toward fulfilling a shared interest.

Media particularly was a significant actor, for example in the Moldova and Ireland cases. It helped citizen groups in shaping priorities of public and government officials and brought issues to the table. In Niger, DRC, and Malawi traditional leaders were significant members of coalition that helped provide legitimacy to the intervention and pro-reform actors. Ireland’s case highlights another potential significant coalition member – international human rights groups – that helped situate the voice of civil society in Ireland in a broader context.

Accountability Systems
Aligning social accountability interventions with the overall accountability system is essential to the effectiveness of these initiatives. Some interventions provided good examples of such alignment. Various interventions linked up with parliaments and legislatures, Ombudsmen, and other independent government agencies to take advantage of the synergies.

The Niger and Uganda cases show how social accountability interventions can be hooked to political accountability systems such as legislatures and parliaments, where parliamentarians and lawmakers facilitated the intervention by holding respective government officials accountable. Similarly, Ombudsman institutions can help bolster internal accountability, as Tajikistan’s case illustrates.
Scaling Up and Across

The process of scaling of social accountability interventions remains a challenge, but is not a straightforward process. The publication discusses some cases that have attempted to scale their interventions. These cases show that scaling up is not simply a process of replication; the strategies that work at the local level need to be adjusted.

India’s case shows that while resource needs drastically change in the process of scaling, the planning process also becomes significantly complex, and calls for creation of networks and skills that are not necessary at the initial stages. These changes require restructuring within the organizations. Malawi’s case shows that sometimes the structure of the program itself needs to change. When World Vision scaled up their social accountability approach to more districts, they had to change the approach since political context in other districts was different, and similar entry points were not available.
### Appendix A: List of Case Studies at GPSA Forum 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Author Organization(s)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Unified Procurement of Medicines in the Dominican Republic: the Role of IPAC (Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative)</td>
<td>Andrea Gallina</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civic Education and Constructive Engagement for Improving Maternal and Reproductive Health</td>
<td>Richard Mugenyi and Victoria Boydell</td>
<td>Reproductive Health Uganda (RHU)/The Evidence Project</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tuungane, a Community-Driven Reconstruction Program</td>
<td>Guillaume Labrecque</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Engaging Traditional Leaders to Promote Child Protection and Access to Education</td>
<td>Donald Mogenyi</td>
<td>World Vision UK</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Scoala Mea (My school) - Empowering citizens to enhance educational accountability and achievement</td>
<td>Victoria Vlad</td>
<td>Expert-Grup</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Citizen monitoring of Road Quality: A Public Affairs Centre Initiative</td>
<td>Samuel Paul</td>
<td>Public Affairs Centre</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Civil Society Engagement within the EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group</td>
<td>Maryati Abdullah Margherita Castelli</td>
<td>Publish What You Pay Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) in Jigawa State</td>
<td>Jibrin Ali Giginyu Adam Suleiman Helen Derbyshire</td>
<td>SAVI</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Improving Social Accountability for the Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
<td>Madina Aliberdieva</td>
<td>Oxfam Tajikistan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Placing People at the Heart of Change</td>
<td>Cecilia Forrestal</td>
<td>Community Action Network</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Municipal services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>